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“You will agree, I’m sure, that there’s nothing more
destructive than a monopoly.”
“Yes,” said Taggart, “on the one hand. On the other,
there’s the blight of unbridled competition.”
“That’s true. That’s very true. The proper course is
always, in my opinion, in the middle. So it is, I think,
the duty of society to snip the extremes, now isn’t it?”
“Yes,” said Taggart, “it is.”
Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged
1 Introduction
Why do we observe markets where regulation restricts the number of firms allowed to
compete, e ectively creating oligopolies of a certain – at times seemingly arbitrary – size?
After all, economic intuition suggests that in a market of profit-seeking firms, welfare
is maximized by ensuring the highest possible degree of competition instead of limiting
market entry. Even beyond the realm of economic theory, “competition is, in our system,
a political and social desideratum” (McNulty, 1968, p. 639).
In some markets existing in practice, however, competition is limited in that only a
number of firms are allowed to enter. In 2016, the Greek government cut the number
of TV licenses granted to privately owned broadcasters from eight to four – only to
change it again to five licenses two years later.1 Similarly, the German football league
(Bundesliga) raised the amount of licenses issued for live pay-TV broadcasts of its matches
in 2016, claiming an improvement not only for fans and viewers, but also for the league’s
finances.2 In New York City, the number of taxis in operation is regulated by the Taxi
and Limousine Commission, which has barely varied the amount of “medallions” since
the 1930s despite the city’s rapid growth in population and size – while the socially
optimal number of such medallions is estimated to be about 55% higher than its current
value.3 Further examples include the number of licenses given out to telecommunication
companies in spectrum auctions or to betting agencies in sport wagering.
1See Iosifidis and Papathanassopoulos (2019) for a timeline.
2Heller and Sudaric (2019) describe the legal and procedural background. For the Bundesliga’s
statement, see http://www.bundesliga.com/de/bundesliga/news/dfl-stellt-eckpunkte-der-
ausschreibung-der-audiovisuellen-medienrechte-fuer-deutschland-ab-2017-18-vor-agmd29-
2.jsp (last retrieved August 17th, 2019).
3The historical development of the number of taxis granted to operate in NYC is outlined by Lagos
(2003), while today’s optimal number is computed by Fréchette et al. (2019).
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Regulators are interested in both consumer surplus and industry profits in most
markets, since the latter can (partly) be extracted using e.g. license auctions.4 Theory
suggests that, unless specific market assumptions are made (which we discuss in the
literature review), utmost competition is optimal: welfare is maximized by having as
many firms as possible compete with one another. While there may be practical reasons
to restrict the market size in specific settings (technical constraints, health concerns, etc.),
from an economic perspective “the limit appears to be rather arbitrary” (Borenstein,
1988, p. 357).
This paper explains restrictions to competition from an economic perspective and
in a standard market absent specific assumptions required by previous work on entry
regulation. We consider a two-stage model. First, a welfare-maximizing regulator specifies
a market size, thus allowing a subset of finitely many interested firms to operate in a
market. She does so e.g. by issuing licenses. Second, those firms to which access is
granted compete à la Cournot. Crucially, firms di er in their marginal costs, with the
costs unknown to the regulator. We show that raising market size by issuing more licenses
has a two-fold e ect: an increase in competition and a decrease in average production
e ciency. We disentangle the two and study their welfare e ects.
Intuitively, opening up the market gives rise to countervailing forces. On the one
hand, it fosters competition. On the other hand, a greater market size also attracts less
e cient firms: since firms with lower marginal costs generate higher profits, they enter
the market first (as they place higher bids when licenses are auctioned o ), while entrants
arriving later produce at higher costs. To single out each e ect, consider this market
opening in two steps. First, add a new firm with production costs equal to the market
average. This heats up competition while leaving production e ciency unchanged. As a
result, prices are driven down, which is detrimental to firms but beneficial for consumers.
Next, raise the entrant’s cost to the value expected by the regulator. Surprisingly, this
cost increase does not necessarily harm firms as a whole: it is possible that an increase
in average marginal costs, keeping the total number of firms fixed, raises total firm
profits. The more e cient firms can exploit the ine ciencies of their high-cost rivals,
taking over their market share. The additional firm profits overcompensate the loss for
consumers caused by the increase in production costs. When more firms are admitted to
a market, we therefore observe a trade-o  due to the two – potentially countervailing –
e ects: fostering competition always increases welfare, while the simultaneous decrease in
production e ciency has an ambiguous impact on welfare. The regulator has to consider
4Kasberger (2018) describes the maximization of firm profits plus consumer surplus as the objective
of “social e ciency” (p. 2).
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both the competition and the cost e ect in her choice of the market size.
Identifying the welfare maximizing market size, we first consider the benchmark
scenario of homogeneous firms. Here, the standard intuition applies as utmost competition
is optimal. The regulator does not impose any restrictions and allows all firms to enter.
But with firms being heterogeneous, the regulator may face the aforementioned trade-o 
between competition and production costs, depending on market characteristics. It
can now become optimal in terms of welfare to enforce an oligopoly, granting market
access only to a limited number of firms. In this case, competition is desirable only to
some extent such that the usual notion of “the more the merrier” does not apply. After
establishing this result analytically, the paper then employs numerical methods to study
how the optimal regulatory policy varies with the market specifications.
The paper proceeds as follows: the existing literature is reviewed in Section 2, while
Section 3 presents the formal model. In Section 4, we first analyze the market equilibrium
given a fixed market size. Subsequently, we solve the regulator’s problem of choosing the
optimal market size to maximize expected total welfare. Section 5 shows that the results
are robust to changes to the model: we analyze both Cournot and Bertrand competition,
i.e. firms setting either prices or quantities; heterogeneity is studied both in marginal costs
and in quality levels; a regulator interested in auction revenue is considered. All proofs
are in the Appendix. Accompanying Mathematica code is available upon request.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds on three strands of literature. First, it uses the framework of oligopolistic
competition in a di erentiated market. Second, it adds to the work on regulation and
in particular on welfare-optimizing restrictions of competition. This line of research
considers a certain market structure and asks what the optimal market size is. A third
line takes the market size as given and varies the structure, showing that a decrease in
production e ciency can lead to a surprising increase in welfare. We elaborate on each
strand in detail.
In the analysis of the present’s paper competition stage, we extend the model of
a di erentiated duopoly to the case of an arbitrary number of competing firms. The
duopoly set-up is introduced in the seminal paper of Singh and Vives (1984). They
study the competition of two firms who di er in their marginal costs and in their goods’
value to consumers. In addition, there are substitutability e ects between the goods.
This di erentiated market has been extended to the case of oligopolies of arbitrary size.
Authors di er, however, in their modeling of firm heterogeneity: either via production
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costs or via quality levels. The first path is taken by Ledvina and Sircar (2011, 2012).
Their model also is the closest to ours. However, they focus on the case of unregulated
entry and analyze which firms want to be active. This paper, on the other hand, considers
the question which firms should be active from a welfare perspective: if entry is attractive
for all firms, how many of them should a regulator allow to operate in order to maximize
total surplus? We therefore endogenize market size, which the authors take as given. The
second path captures the heterogeneity of firms via quality rather than via production
costs. Häckner (2000) presents such a model, assuming production costs of zero for all
firms. He focuses on a comparison of equilibria under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
We adopt this framework in an extension. In particular, we show that our results
qualitatively carry over to this form of heterogeneity. Hsu and Wang (2005) also use this
model and add a welfare analysis. Again, however, they consider a fixed market size,
while we are interested in the regulator’s optimal choice of this variable.
A vast literature has emerged on the optimal regulation of market sizes. In particular,
this literature endogenizes the number of firms competing with one another and seeks to
provide a rationale for limiting competition. A classic argument goes back to Schumpeter
(1942), who argues that increasing returns to scale can outweigh the downsides of a
monopoly. He thus requires decreasing marginal costs to justify a lack of competition.
Stiglitz (1981) and Spence (1984) study a dynamic model where firms’ choices of R&D
lead to ine ciently low welfare levels: incumbents deter potential entrants by investing
excessively in R&D in order to keep their productions costs low. While the authors do
not explicitly study optimal regulatory policies, a limit to the market size would remedy
the detrimental impact on welfare stemming from the firms’ incentive to create entry
barriers via wasteful investment levels. In a di erent approach, von Weizsäcker (1980) as
well as Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) consider a static model with production levels being
the firms’ strategic choices. Their works, however, require the existence of fixed costs to
explain an ine ciently high number of market entrants. Yet another path is taken by
Stiglitz (1987): he considers search costs incurred by consumers who are looking for the
preferred o er. Having too many firms operating in a market can cause ine ciently high
search costs for only minor utility gains. In addition, there are works analyzing specific
markets and the optimal regulation of their size, e.g. Kawakami (2017) who considers
the case of securities trading. All of the literature in this strand therefore hinges on
specific assumptions in order to rationalize a regulation of the market size. In particular,
their analyzes require either fixed costs, search costs, decreasing marginal costs or R&D
investments. None of them carry over to the case of constant marginal costs, which we
consider. We thus add to this literature by providing a rationale for regulation in a more
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standard situation.
Finally, we turn to the third strand, analyzing how welfare is a ected by production
e ciency. This line of research considers a fixed market size and varies the production
costs of some of the competing firms. Salop and Sche man (1983) show that a firm
may prefer to raise its competitor’s costs – e.g. by inducing suppliers to boycott this
rival – over predatory pricing. This competitor, however, obviously su ers, raising the
question of the net e ect of such behavior. Kimmel (1992) therefore studies the e ect
on total firm profits, arguing that the net e ect may in fact be positive: if a small firm
becomes less e cient, the benefit to its competitors from taking over the market share
may outweigh the loss for the small firm. Yet, he does not consider consumers, whose
utility decreases if any firm’s production costs rise. The net e ect thus remains unclear.
Lahiri and Ono (1988) [henceforth LO] add consumers to the welfare analysis. They show
that “helping” a small firm, e.g. by boosting its e ciency, may in fact lower total welfare.
Our model di ers mainly in three aspects. First, we allow for a di erentiated market,
while goods are necessarily homogeneous in the case of LO. We can therefore, second,
explicitly study how market characteristics (degree of substitutability, quality of goods,
size of the firm pool) a ect the necessity for a regulator to intervene. Third, in the setup
of LO, the regulator is perfectly informed about the firms’ costs. As Baron and Myerson
(1982) argue, “[t]his assumption is unlikely to be met in reality, since the firm would be
expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator” (p. 911). We
therefore model asymmetric information between firms and regulator. In particular, we
assume firms’ costs are random variables whose realization is unknown to the regulator.
A more detailed analysis of the relevance of information in oligopolistic competition is
conducted by Eliaz and Forges (2015). They consider the strategic interaction between a
regulator and competing firms in an environment of asymmetric information. In their
paper, however, it is the regulator who has an informational advantage and seeks to
maximize welfare by choosing an optimal information structure for the firms. In our
model, the asymmetry is to the regulator’s disadvantage and she needs to maximize
welfare by specifying the market size instead. All papers in this strand take the market
size as given, while we endogenize it.
3 Model
We study a two-stage game. In the first stage, a welfare-maximizing regulator specifies
the market size. She does so by choosing the number of firms allowed to enter, e.g. via
issuing licenses. In the second stage, those firms that are granted access compete in a
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Cournot style. Firms are heterogeneous in their marginal costs, where we refer to a firm
with lower costs as “more e cient” throughout this paper.
Regulator: The regulator faces a pool of m œ N firms that seek to enter a market. She
chooses the market size n Æ m, specifying the number of firms allowed to enter. Her goal
is to maximize total welfare, given by consumer surplus and firm profits. The regulator
is unaware of each firm’s marginal costs. She knows only the cost distribution and the
fact that given a market size n, the n firms with the lowest costs are going to enter the
market.
We discuss this form of market regulation in more detail in Section 4.3. It is shown
that the regulator could benefit from more sophisticated mechanisms allocating permits
to enter the market. We will argue that entry of the most e cient firms – rather than
selecting specific firms – is a political desideratum rather than an economic one in many
regulatory settings. We construct a mechanism and equilibrium strategies implementing
this goal, ensuring that more e cient firms indeed enter the market first.
In addition, we follow the empirical observation that the regulator can grant or deny
market access to firms, but that she cannot prevent the firms’ strategic profit-maximizing
behavior once in the market. The socially optimal solution would require a regulation of
production levels and prices to their first-best levels, which in practice is not available to
the regulator in competitive markets. Our results extend to the case where the regulator’s
objective is not to maximize total welfare but rather the sum of consumer surplus and
auction revenue generated from selling licenses for market entry, as shown in Section 5.3.
Firms: There are m œ N firms seeking to participate in the market. Each firm
i œ {1, . . . ,m} produces quantity qi of a good at marginal cost ci. Firms sell their goods
at price pi given by the consumers’ inverse demand. A firm’s profit function is given by
ﬁi(pi, qi) = qi(pi ≠ ci). (1)
Firms are heterogeneous in marginal costs ci. Their costs (or “types”) are i.i.d. draws
from U [0, 1].5 Denote a cost profile by c = (c1, . . . , cm) œ [0, 1]m. Firms know each
others’ types, while the regulator does not. This information structure is motivated by
producers having more detailed insights into the technical requirements of the specific
5The results presented in this paper qualitatively carry over to other cost distributions such as a
binary one. However, even for these relatively “simple” distributions, closed form solutions do not exist
in general. We therefore focus on the uniform case as opposed to more complex ones in order to identify
more easily the di erent e ects that come into play from the regulator’s perspective.
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market and the cost structure of their rivals than a government does. It allows us to
focus on the regulator’s optimal policy facing both imperfect competition and imperfect
information without the additional complexity of firm’s strategic choices made under
uncertainty.6 We later identify conditions such that indeed all firms find it profitable to
engage in competition.
After the regulator has specified a market size n Æ m in the first stage, the n
firms with the lowest marginal costs enter, e.g. by having obtained a license. In the
second stage, they engage in competition à la Cournot and choose their production levels
q © (q1, . . . , qn).7
Consumers: There is a unit mass of consumers (or a single representative consumer,
equivalently) with a standard utility function: utility is quadratic in the goods q, while it
is linear and separable in the numeraire good. With prices denoted by p © (p1, . . . , pn),
the consumers’ optimization problem is
max
qœRn+
U(q)≠
nÿ
i=1
piqi, (2)
yielding the inverse demand function p(q). We extend the standard model of a di erenti-
ated duopoly à la Singh and Vives (1984) to an oligopolistic setting, writing
U(q) = –
nÿ
i=1
qi ≠ 12
3 nÿ
i=1
q2i + “
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
qiqj
4
. (3)
Here, “ specifies the degree of product di erentiation: for “ = 0, goods are independent,
while for “ = 1 they are perfect substitutes. We allow for arbitrary “ œ [0, 1]. The factor
– can be interpreted as a common quality of all goods, which is su ciently large such
that market entry is profitable for all firms (see Lemma 2 below).8
6For a motivation for this information structure commonly used in the regulation of competitive
markets, see e.g. by Vickers (1995). For an analysis of optimal information provision to competing firms,
see Eliaz and Forges (2015).
7The results presented qualitatively carry over to a Bertrand market. This robustness is studied in
Section 5.1. For a comparison of firm entry under Cournot and Bertrand competition see Cellini et al.
(2004).
8Alternatively, firms could be heterogeneous in quality levels (–1, . . . ,–m) rather than in costs. Again,
the results presented in this paper a robust to such change of the model. See Section 5.2 for an analysis.
8
4 Analysis
To identify the optimal market size, we use backward induction. We first solve the
consumers’ optimization problem to obtain the inverse demand function p(q) given a
profile of quantities q posted by the firms. Second, firms anticipate consumer demand
and choose their production levels qi as a function of the cost profile c. This gives
rise to equilibrium quantities and prices in a market of n firms. Third, we determine
the regulator’s choice of the market size n to maximize total welfare, where her choice
determines the cost distribution of those firms active in the market.
The analysis is structured as follows: Sections 4.1 and 4.2 study the competitive market
stage where firms and consumers interact. All results presented here are independent of
the cost profile and hence do not hinge on the assumption of only the most e cient firms
being active in the market. In Section 4.3, we turn to the mechanism governing market
entry. We introduce and motivate an auction ensuring the entry of the n most e cient
firms whilst also discussing superior mechanisms. Given this form of entry, Section 4.4
assesses the optimal market size and presents the main result, while Section 4.5 considers
comparative statics.
4.1 Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
Consumers face the optimization problem given by eq. (2). Observing quantities q
produced by the firms, consumers’ inverse demand is given by
pi = –≠ qi ≠ “
ÿ
j ”=i
qj . (4)
Each firm i sets its production level qi to maximize profit ﬁi = qi(pi ≠ ci), given
inverse demand and a cost profile c. Taking into account its rivals’ production levels
qj (j ”= i), firm i thus chooses
qi =
1
2(–≠ ci ≠ “
ÿ
j ”=i
qj). (5)
Summing over all firms and rearranging yields a firm’s chosen quantity as a function of
the cost profile. We define ⁄ = {(2≠ “)[2 + “(n≠ 1)]}≠1 > 0 and obtain:
qi = ⁄
Ë
–(2≠ “)≠ [2 + “(n≠ 2)]ci + “
ÿ
j ”=i
cj
È
, (6)
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resulting in prices
pi = ⁄
Ë
–(2≠ “) + [2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)]ci + “
ÿ
j ”=i
cj
È
. (7)
Regarding the comparative statics of these equilibrium strategies,9 consider an increase
in firm i’s marginal costs ci: the firm reacts by producing a lower quantity, while its rivals
increase production to take over the market share. This increase is more aggressive if
goods are more substitutable as consumers are more easily persuaded to switch producers
(d2qj/d“ dci > 0 for j ”= i).
Prices paid by consumers rise for all goods following a rise in firm i’s marginal
costs: with ci increasing, the supply of good qi is lowered. At this lower level of
consumption, consumers’ marginal benefit is greater for all goods, see eq. (8) below.
Thus, also the firm whose costs have increased will enjoy a higher price for its goods. The
willingness of consumers to pay higher prices to this specific firm, however, decreases in
the substitutability of goods: consumers start purchasing some of the alternative goods
instead (d2pj/d“ dci is negative for j = i and positive for j ”= i). As goods become less
di erentiated (more substitutable), the price increase accepted by consumers diminishes
for the firm whose production costs have grown and becomes larger for the competitors’
goods.
The following lemma summarizes these results and mirrors standard observations
from Cournot competition in a di erentiated market. It focuses on the comparative
statics of equilibrium prices and quantities, while e ects on profits, expenditure and
welfare are studied in subsequent sections.
Lemma 1. When the marginal costs of firm i increase, . . .
a) this firm’s production level decreases,
b) its competitors’ production levels increase,
c) all prices increase.
The market equilibrium given by eqs. (6) and (7) resembles the results of Ledvina
and Sircar (2012). We extend their analysis by also identifying conditions ensuring that
production is profitable for every firm. Since we are interested in the regulator’s choice of
optimal market size, we want to focus on the case where each firm finds market entrance
9Omitting solutions where all production levels and prices are zero, this equilibrium is unique, which
follows from applying the Poincaré-Hopf index theorem, see e.g. Vives (1999).
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attractive. That is, we want to ensure that each firm wants to enter the market but
should not necessarily do so from a welfare perspective. To this end we need to require a
su ciently large quality – of all goods. Intuitively, consider the marginal benefit to a
consumer purchasing some (not necessarily optimal) quantity qi,
ˆU(q)
ˆqi
= –≠ qi ≠ “
ÿ
j ”=i
qj . (8)
For – large enough and low consumption levels, this marginal benefit outweighs the
marginal costs pi from additional consumption (note that ˆpiˆ– < 1). If, on the other
hand, the quality – is too low, the detrimental e ects dominate. These e ects stem from,
first, diminishing marginal utility and, second, substitutability of goods. The equilibrium
quantity given by eq. (6) would then prescribe negative consumption levels. The following
lemma derives a lower bound on the quality ensuring positive supply levels and prices.
Lemma 2. A su cient condition for prices and quantities given by eqs. (6) and (7) to
be weakly positive is – Ø m, i.e.
– Ø m∆ pi, qi Ø 0 ’i, n,m, c, “ s.t. 1 Æ i Æ n Æ m, (c, “) œ [0, 1]m+1. (9)
Throughout this paper, we assume that – Ø m is satisfied. If – < m, the least
e cient firms would instead choose a production level of zero rather than following
eq. (6). Market entry would thus be unattractive for them in the first place. As seen from
the equilibrium quantities, we have qi Ø qj … ci Æ cj . That is, only those firms with
costs below a threshold c¯ would choose their production according to eq. (6), where n is
replaced by the number of firms in this set, i.e. |{i|ci Æ c¯}|. In this case, opening up the
market and allowing more firms to enter does not have any e ect: the cost distribution
of firms with strictly positive production levels is truncated at c¯ and all newly arriving
firms a ect neither prices nor quantities of the incumbents. The number of active firms,
however, depends on the specific cost realization and is not known ex ante.
Note that – Ø m ensures strictly positive production levels for all firms apart from the
polar case of n = m = –, “ = ci = 1 and cj = 0 ’j ”= i, where we obtain qi = 0. However,
all firms (including firm i) still produce according to eq. (6), and i can thus still be
considered “active”. The assumption – Ø m hence is su cient to prevent discontinuities
in production decisions.
Finally, it is readily verified from eq. (6) that for any market size n and any cost
profile c, the entry of an additional firm causes all incumbents to lower their production
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levels irrespective of the new rival’s costs, while the total production level increases:
qi(c1, . . . , cn, cn+1) Æ qi(c1, . . . , cn) ’i, n, c,
n+1ÿ
i=1
qi(c1, . . . , cn, cn+1) Ø
nÿ
i=1
qi(c1, . . . , cn) ’n, c. (10)
Having computed the equilibrium behavior of firms and consumers, we next turn to an
analysis of their respective welfare levels.
4.2 Consumer Surplus, Firm Profits and Total Welfare
In the previous section we derived equilibrium prices and quantities as well as their
changes following an increase in a firm’s marginal costs. We now analyze how these
e ects carry over to the welfare of consumers, firms, and both sides taken together. That
is, we still consider a fixed market size n with a known cost profile c and will only later
turn to the regulator’s optimal choice of n.
Given a profile of production levels q, prices p and marginal costs c, we can determine
consumer surplus WC(n) = U(q) ≠qni=1 piqi as well as firm profits WF(n) = qni=1 ﬁi.
Together, they constitute total welfare,
Wtot(n) = WC(n) +WF(n) = [U(q)≠
nÿ
i=1
piqi] +
nÿ
i=1
ﬁi. (11)
To single out the e ects caused by a change in marginal costs, we separate terms linear
in the costs (ci), squared (c2i ) as well as mixed (cicj) terms. This way, welfare expressions
take the following form:
Wtot(n) = ÷1 + ÷2
nÿ
i=1
ci + ÷3
nÿ
i=1
c2i + ÷4
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj , (12)
with the same form (but di erent coe cients ÷) if we only consider consumer surplus
or firm profits. Each coe cient ÷ is a function of quality –, product substitutability “
and market size n.10 Due to the complexity of these expressions, we defer their explicit
form to Appendix A, see eq. (22). Analyzing the e ect of a change in marginal costs on
welfare, however, is insightful for the regulator’s decision studied below. The first set of
observations comes at no surprise:
10The total number of firms, m, only enters through the regulator’s expectations over marginal costs.
Here, we consider a known cost profile c. Therefore, eq. (12) is independent of m.
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Lemma 3. When the marginal costs of some firm i increase, . . .
a) this firm’s profit decreases,
b) its rivals’ profits increase,
c) consumer expenditure on this firm’s good decreases,
d) consumer surplus decreases.
For an intuition, recall the e ect on equilibrium prices and quantities caused by an
increase in marginal costs, as stated in Lemma 1: when firm i’s costs increase, it responds
by lowering its own output, while its rivals increase their quantities. At the same time,
all prices rise. Thus, there are two countervailing e ects for firm i: a detrimental cost
increase and a beneficial price increase. As Lemma 3 shows, the former e ect outweighs
the latter (that is, we have dpidci <
dci
dci=1), so that the increase in costs drives down i’s
profits.
Next, consider the e ect on consumer behavior. As the production level of good qi is
lowered, consumers’ marginal benefit increases, see eq. (8). Hence, they are willing to
pay an increased price. Regarding consumers’ total spending on firm i’s good, there thus
also are two countervailing e ects at work: a decrease in the quantity produced and an
increase in the price paid. This resembles the impact of distortionary taxation under
imperfect competition, where an exogenous change causes prices to rise and quantities to
shrink.11 Again, Lemma 3 shows that the former e ect dominates and consumer spending
on firm i’s good, qipi, decreases. Given this decrease in their expenditure, consumers
substitute by purchasing more of the other goods. Since the prices of these other goods
have also increased subsequent to the change in i’s marginal costs, consumer surplus is
lowered.
We now turn to the rivals of firm i. They benefit from the cost increase in a two-fold
way. First, there is the consumers’ reallocation of money just mentioned, enabling them
to spend a larger fraction of their budget on all goods other than qi. Second, quantities
of these firms also increase: as firm i decreases production given its increased marginal
costs, the rivals take over some of the market share. Both of these e ects increase profits
of the competitors whose cost have not changed. Furthermore, consumer expenditure on
the goods of the competitors trivially increases, as both quantities and prices have grown.
As a final remark, note again the (standard) finding that firms with lower marginal
costs have higher profits when participating in the market. This rationalizes our assump-
11See e.g. Anderson et al. (2001) for an analysis.
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tion that more e cient firms enter the market first, e.g. because they accept higher prices
for licenses permitting such entry, or because they place higher bids in an auction setting.
The e ect on total welfare: An increase in a firm’s marginal costs drives down
consumer surplus but raises profits for all competitors of this firm, as just shown. This
poses the question in which direction total welfare and total firm profits can change.
In particular, is it possible that total welfare increases due to a firm’s marginal costs
having grown, ceteris paribus? (Note that if this is the case, total firm profits also
necessarily increase.) In standard Cournot settings with homogeneous firms, total welfare
unambiguously decreases in marginal production costs.12 With heterogeneous costs,
however, we find:
Proposition 1. When a firm’s marginal costs increase, total welfare may increase.
We separate the e ects on total welfare caused by a change in firm i’s marginal costs,
where we know the sign of each e ect from Lemma 3. First, consumers su er from an
increase in marginal costs and their surplus decreases. Second, firm i’s profit is driven
down, and third, the profits of i’s competitors rise. More formally, we have
dWtot
dci
= dWCdci¸ ˚˙ ˝
Æ0
consumer e ect
+ dﬁidci¸˚˙˝
Æ0
firm e ect
+
ÿ
j ”=i
dﬁj
dci¸˚˙˝
Ø0
competitor e ect
R 0. (13)
When does the positive competitor e ect outweigh the negative consumer and firm
e ects? As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, this is the case if, first, firm i is relatively
ine cient even before the increase in its costs (ci large), and hence it has a small market
share. Second, (most of) its competitors need to be relatively e cient, i.e. their costs cj
should be low. To shed light on these requirements, we look at higher order derivatives
of total welfare. In particular, we analyze how the magnitude of each e ect varies with
the costs of firm i and its competitors.
We start with the competitor e ect. Recall from eq. (6) that firm j has larger
production levels if its own costs are low and those of its rival i are high. This production
level qj precisely drives the magnitude of the competitor e ect: note we can write
ﬁj = qj(pj ≠ cj) = [qj(c)]2 for firm profits and the competitor e ect size is hence given
by 2qj dqjdci . This term is large for firm j being e cient and i being ine cient, as such a
cost profile drives up qj according to eq. (6) and the derivative dqjdci is independent of the
12This is shown e.g. by Corchón (2008) as well as by Lemma 5 below in the present paper.
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costs. The positive impact on total welfare hence is amplified if the two requirements
introduced above are met.
Next, consider the firm e ect, analogously given by 2qi dqidci . The e ect size is small (in
absolute terms) if firm i produces sparsely. This, again, is the case if i itself is ine cient
while its rivals are e cient. If so, we therefore have a small negative e ect on firm i’s
profits and a large positive e ect on the competitors’ profits. The detrimental impact
of i’s loss on total firm profits and on total welfare will be outweighed by the positive
competitor e ect. Before discussing the consumer e ect, we capture this finding that the
net e ect on firm profits may in fact be positive, which directly follows from combining
Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 d):
Corollary 1. When a firm’s marginal costs increase, total firm profits may increase.
Finally, we turn to the consumer e ect. From eq. (12) we know that it is given by
dWC
dci = ÷
C
2 + 2÷C3 ci + 2÷C4
q
j ”=i cj . As shown in the proof, it holds that ÷C3 > 0: although
consumers su er from the cost increase of firm i, they do so to a lesser extent if firm i’s
costs are high. Intuitively, given a high value of ci, consumers purchase only little of
qi anyway. Now, if the costs ci grow, the price pi does so, too. But since consumption
levels qi are low, this a ects consumers’ net utility less than if i was more e cient
and hence consumption levels were higher. Just as for the firm e ect, the detrimental
consequences of an increase in some firm’s costs are diminished if this firm already is
relatively ine cient in the first place.
To conclude, Proposition 1 shows that there are specific cost profiles where an increase
in a firm’s marginal costs can cause a somewhat surprising increase in total welfare.
More specifically, this is the case if the firm whose costs increase is relatively small and
ine cient, while the opposite is true for its rivals.13
4.3 Market Entry
So far, we have studied the competitive market stage where firms and consumers interact.
We now turn to the regulator’s task of governing market entry. While this section
motivates her choice to admit only the most e cient firms and proposes an auction
implementing this outcome, while the subsequent Section 4.4 analyzes the optimal number
of e cient firms that should be allowed to compete given this specific form of regulation.
13This resembles findings presented by Lahiri and Ono (1988) for the e ect on total welfare and by
Kimmel (1992) for firm profits only.
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Optimal regulatory mechanisms: Note first that regulation ensuring competition
of only the most e cient firms is not necessarily optimal ex post. Denote a profile of
the firms’ realized costs by its order statistics (c(1), . . . , c(m)), where c(i) Æ c(i+1) for
all i. Having the n Æ m most e cient firms enter the market will induce the profile
(c(1), . . . , c(n)) at the competition stage. But from Proposition 1 we have learned that
total welfare can increase if a small firm becomes less e cient. Hence, keeping the cost
profile and the market size fixed, inducing firms (c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(m)) to compete instead
may be socially preferable.
The optimal composition of firms at the competition stage therefore depends on the
realized cost profile. Any regulatory mechanism striving to maximize total welfare should
thus seek to elicit this profile and then select individual firms to enter the market. Recall
that each firm knows the marginal costs of all of its (potential) competitors. Since a firm’s
profit – and hence its valuation of entering the market – depends on the whole cost profile,
the regulator faces a problem of interdependent valuations and symmetric information
among the bidders. In the spirit of Crémer and McLean (1988), this information can
easily and costlessly be extracted using a “shoot the liar mechanism”, where each firm
is asked for a report on the whole cost profile and deviations from the consensus are
penalized. Having obtained the cost profile, the regulator then hand-picks the firms she
finds preferable in her objective to maximize total welfare.
Practical considerations: In the light of this observation, why do we nevertheless
focus on an entry of the firms with lowest production costs? The focus is motivated by a
perception governing many procurement processes and license auctions in practice: when
striving for e cient outcomes, “[e] ciency [is] understood as putting the licenses into
the hands of the bidders with the best business plans” (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002,
p. C79). Rather than maximizing total welfare ex post, the auction merely “ensures that
the object is allocated to that bidder that values it most” (van Damme, 2002, p. 7). Now
recall that in the present model, a firm’s profit decreases in its marginal costs irrespective
of the rivals active in the market (Lemma 3). Hence, more e cient firms have a higher
valuation of market entry independently of the firms they are going to compete with.
An auction that causes the firms with lowest costs to enter in equilibrium therefore
satisfies the requirement of granting access only to those with highest valuations and
meets a political rather than a purely economic objective.14 This requirement forms the
14An additional economic rationale for procurement to the most e cient firms is given by the incentives
for R&D investments thus created: regulators want to induce firm innovations due to spillover e ects and
hence “reward” more e cient firms for their investments by choosing allocations accordingly. Che et al.
(2016) analyze the provision of innovation incentives in public procurement.
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constraint subject to which total welfare will be maximized in the next section: given
that only the most e cient firms enter, how large should the market be?
Before turning to this question, we introduce an auction that does indeed implement
the desired order of entry. For a fixed market size n, we can describe the process of
allocating licenses by a multiunit auction in which n identical items are sold to m bidders
with a cap of one item per bidder. The following lemma states that if licenses are
auctioned o  sequentially, with all bids being revealed after each round15 and each round
selling a single license to enter the market at a second price auction, then there is an
equilibrium where indeed the n most e cient firms enter the market. In addition, firms
bid their valuation truthfully on the equilibrium path.
Lemma 4. Consider n sequential second-price single-unit open-bid auctions. There is
an equilibrium in bidding strategies where each of the n most e cient firms wins one of
the units for any cost profile.
The equilibrium hinges on grim trigger strategies preventing more e cient firms from
postponing their bids in hope of acquiring a license in later rounds at a cheaper price.
More specifically, a selection of the remaining firms then starts bidding the monopoly
profit, thus punishing the deviant, while also ensuring that overbidding is unattractive
for the less e cient firms. For details, see the proof.
Note three remarks on the auction and the equilibrium discussed above. First, the
allocation of licenses does not change if we allow for an aftermarket where firms can sell
their licenses to those rivals who failed to place winning bids. Only less e cient firms
have not yet obtained a license, but their valuation of holding one is lower than for each
of the firms in possession of a license as long as the profile of competitors is unchanged.
Bilateral exchange between firms therefore does not lead to a reallocation, although a
centralized clearing house with side transfers could. Second, the equilibrium outcome of
the n most e cient firms acquiring one item each is not unique. Consider the case of
m = 3, n = 1 and c1 < c2 < c3, implying ﬁ1 > ﬁ2 > ﬁ3. The bidding profile (b1, b2, b3)
with b2 > ﬁ1 > ﬁ2 > ﬁ3 > b3 > b1 is an equilibrium where firm 2 instead of the more
e cient firm 1 wins the only item. Third, an equilibrium of only the most e cient firms
entering can also be implemented using a uniform-price auction selling all licenses at the
same market-clearing price. This does, however, generate a much lower auction revenue.
To conclude, the focus on firms entering in the order of their e ciency as mandated
in practice puts an additional constraint on the regulator’s optimization problem. Rather
than first eliciting the firms’ privately held information and maximizing total welfare ex
15As shown in the proof, it su ces to reveal the winning bid and the winning bidder’s identity.
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post, she only regulates the number of firms allowed to enter and maximizes welfare ex
ante, considering the expected costs of those firms who will compete.
4.4 Regulating the Market Size
We are now able to identify the optimal market size from the perspective of the welfare-
maximizing regulator. Given a size n, she knows that the n most e cient firms will enter
into competition – but she has to form expectations about the costs of the firms seeking
to compete. Formally, her optimization problem is to find
nú = argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ec[Wtot(n)]. (14)
This section now presents the paper’s key results. We first consider a benchmark
scenario of homogeneous firms, all having the same marginal costs. These costs may
or may not be known by the regulator. In this setting, the standard intuition of more
competition being optimal does apply: welfare is always maximized by having all firms
compete, as shown in Lemma 5. This result changes, however, if firms are heterogeneous:
it can now be optimal to restrict market size, thus limiting the number of firms allowed
to compete. An increase in competition, caused by opening up the market, no longer
necessarily implies an increase in total welfare, as Proposition 2 shows. This result
therefore justifies the restrictions to market sizes observed in practice.
We motivated the regulator’s interest in total welfare by her possibility to (partly)
extract firm profits via the sale of permits to participate in the market, e.g. by auctioning
o  licenses. Her objective hence is to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and firm
profits. If she was only interested in the former, full competition would always be optimal
and there would be no restriction at the optimum.
4.4.1 Homogeneous Firms
As a benchmark, we consider the pool of m firms to be homogeneous. That is, they all
share the same marginal costs ci = c œ [0, 1]. Their goods may still be di erentiated, i.e.
we still allow for any degree of product di erentiation “ œ [0, 1] as well as any quality
level – satisfying the condition stated in eq. (9). The results presented here hold both if
the regulator observes c and if she is unaware of the costs realized, knowing only that
they are uniformly distributed.
As the following lemma states, an increase in competition always (weakly) increases
total welfare if firms are homogeneous. That is, the regulator always finds it optimal to
18
grant market access to all firms. There is no rationale to limit the market size.
Lemma 5. If firms are homogeneous, it is always welfare-optimal to allow all firms to
enter the market:
If ci = c œ [0, 1] ’i : argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ec[Wtot(n)] = m ’–, “,m s.t. 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ m Æ –.
This result confirms the standard intuition that in a market where firms cannot be
forced to set their prices or production levels in a welfare-maximizing way, it is optimal
to have as many of them as possible compete with one another. Allowing more firms to
enter the market increases competition and has a known two-fold e ect. First, it reduces
each firm’s profits by lowering both production levels and prices. This is seen from
recalling eqs. (6) and (7), where we can write qi = q, pi = p ’i if firms are homogeneous:
dq
dn =
dp
dn = ≠⁄
2“(–≠ c) Æ 0. (15)
Second, opening up the market increases consumer surplus: there is a larger variety
of goods available and prices are lowered. In a setting of homogeneous firms, the latter
e ect outweighs the former: the benefit to consumers from having more competition
overcompensates the loss to each firm. In consequence, total welfare is maximized by
allowing all firms to enter.
As a final remark, note the result above is independent of the distribution of c.
Unrestricted market access is optimal for any homogeneous cost realization c œ [0, 1] and
even if the regulator knows the realized costs ex ante.
4.4.2 Heterogeneous Firms
Having considered a setting with symmetric firms, we now turn to a more realistic market
with heterogeneous firms whose production costs may di er. We start with a simple
numerical example. Let there be two potential entrants with marginal costs c1 = 0, c2 = 1.
Their goods are perfectly di erentiated and consumer utility is given by U(q1, q2) =
4(q1+ q2)≠ 12(q21 + q22). We compare total welfare in a monopoly of the more e cient firm
1 with an duopoly where both firms compete. In the monopoly, we find qmon = pmon = 2,
resulting in a total welfare of W totmon = ﬁmon+WCSmon = 4+2 = 6. In contrast, the duopoly
setting yields q1 = p1 = p2 = 53 , q2 = 23 andW totduo = ﬁ1+ﬁ2+WCSduo = 259 + 49+ 4918 = 10718 < 6.
Opening up the market to allow for more competition hence slightly lowers welfare.
We extend this example to the general model introduced above to identify market
characteristics making restrictions to competition optimal. That is, we allow for an
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arbitrary degree of product di erentiation “, quality level – and firm pool size m. In
addition, we consider asymmetric information on the firms’ marginal costs, where the
regulator only knows the cost distribution. Each firm i has a cost type ci ≥ U [0, 1] i.i.d.
Recall from eq. (12) the form of the expression for total welfare: it contains terms which
are linear in the costs (ci), squared (c2i ) as well as mixed (cicj). We compute the expected
value of these expressions, given a firm pool size m (exogenous) and a market size n
(chosen by the regulator), in Appendix B.1.
As the following proposition shows, optimal market regulation can change dramatically
if firms are heterogeneous. For homogeneous firms (see Section 4.4.1) we saw it is always
preferable to have as many firms as possible compete with one another. This no longer
holds true if production costs di er. Instead, total welfare may now be maximized
by restricting market access, creating a setting which is neither monopolistic nor fully
competitive. This provides a rationale for the seemingly arbitrary restriction of market
access sometimes observed in practice.
Proposition 2. If firms are heterogeneous, it can be welfare-optimal to limit competition:
÷–, “,m with 0 Æ “ Æ 1 < m Æ – s.t. 1 < argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ec[Wtot(n)] < m.
When the regulator opens up the market by allowing more firms to enter, there are
two forces a ecting total welfare: a competition e ect and a cost e ect. The competition
e ect resemble the observation made in the setting of homogeneous firms. As the number
of firms competing increases, prices and production levels are driven down. This harms
each firm’s profits, but raises consumer surplus. In addition, there now is an increase
in variety: consumers benefit from a larger number of di erent goods, each yielding
quality –, but they also face more substitution, lowering their utility. The net impact of
this competition e ect, however, is positive, as seen from Lemma 5: in a market with
homogeneous firms, a larger number of entrants unambiguously improves total welfare.
Under firm heterogeneity, we now observe a second e ect caused by a change to the
market size: the cost e ect. Since firms enter the market in the order of their e ciency,
a newly arriving firm is known to be less e cient than those already in the market.
This obviously changes the number of firms, captured by the competition e ect. But
it also changes the cost distribution, as it increases expected average production costs
or, equivalently, decreases expected average e ciency. Intuitively, we can single out the
latter e ect by first adding a firm whose marginal costs are equal to the current market
average (changing only the market size and thus creating a competition e ect) and then
decreasing the entrant’s costs to the expected value given by the (n+1)-th order statistic.
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In this second step, we e ectively reduce the e ciency of a single firm and can hence
recall Proposition 1, stating that such a reduction may in fact raise welfare. That is, the
impact of the cost e ect is ambiguous. It is hence not straightforward to see the net
e ect on total welfare if the market size is increased: the competition e ect drives up
total welfare, the cost e ect may point in either direction.
As Proposition 2 shows, the cost e ect caused by opening up the market can in fact
be so detrimental to welfare that it outweighs the positive competition e ect. Conversely,
it can be beneficial to limit the market size: at the optimal market size nú, the two
opposing e ects balance each other and welfare is maximized. As opposed to a setting of
homogeneous firms, the net e ect of an increase in competition no longer is necessarily
positive. Instead, restrictions to market access are rationalized if firms are heterogeneous.
Total production level: The two opposing forces of competition and cost e ect can
also be observed when looking at the expected total quantity of goods produced in
equilibrium. Again, opening up the market and allowing more firms to enter has two
countervailing consequences. From a firm’s individual quantity choice qi in eq. (6) we
obtain the total production level,
Q ©
nÿ
i=1
qi =
n–≠qni=1 ci
2 + “(n≠ 1) . (16)
First consider the competition e ect. We increase the number of firms while keeping
costs constant, i.e. setting marginal costs ci = c for all firms. This yields
dQ|ci=c
dn =
(2≠ “)(–≠ c)
[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2 > 0, (17)
driving up the production level. At the same time, a newly arriving firm lowers expected
average e ciency. To single out this cost e ect, let the number of firms n be fixed and
increase average costs 1n
qn
i=1 ci in eq. (16). This lowers the total level of goods produced
and hence works against the competition e ect. As the following lemma shows, the net
e ect is positive nevertheless:
Lemma 6. If firms are heterogeneous, opening up the market always increases the
expected level of total production.
In a market with homogeneous firms, this result comes at no surprise: as more firms
enter, the total production level moves from an ine ciently low level towards the e cient
competitive level. Under heterogeneity, however, the net e ect is not as obvious, as the
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increase in (expected) average costs drives down the overall quantity of goods. In the
case of total welfare, this cost e ect may outweigh the competition e ect, as we saw
in Proposition 2. Concerning production levels, however, the competition e ect always
dominates. In short, more firms always cause more production, but they may cause less
welfare.
The optimal market size: So far, we have focused on the qualitative finding that
some restriction to the market size may be optimal. On the quantitative side, one may
be interested in, first, the actual size optimally chosen by the regulator and, second, the
requirements that need to be met for such restriction to be optimal. The answers to
both questions will depend on the market characteristics – that is, on the exogenous
parameters: quality level –, degree of product di erentiation “, and size of the firm pool
m.
However, an explicit solution to the regulator’s optimization problem given by
argmaxnœ{1,...,m} Ec[Wtot(n)] does in general not exist. This is because it is has the
implicit form of a quintic polynomial equation to which there is no general algebraic
solution in radicals.16 Given a specific set of market characteristics, a solution can
nevertheless be derived numerically. In the next section we therefore use simulations to
analyze the way in which the market characteristics a ect the regulator’s optimal policy.
4.5 The E ect of Market Characteristics
Interaction of consumers and firms is determined by the characteristics of the market we
study. In particular, the specific strategies chosen and outcomes implemented depend
on the exogenous parameters observed by both sides. Market interaction therefore is
driven by quality level –, degree of product di erentiation “, and size m of the firm pool.
In this section, we analyze how each of these values a ects the regulator’s policy, i.e.
their e ect on the optimal market size nú. We do so using computational methods, in
particular numerical simulations. Observations stemming from such simulations will be
referred to as Results, as opposed to the lemmata and propositions above, which were
analytically proved.
In the following, we plot the optimal market size nú as a function of the market
characteristics –, “,m. In each of the Figures 1 to 3, the solid bold line indicates where
nú = m is just optimal. The line thus separates two parameter ranges: to one side of
16The impossibility to derive an explicit solution follows from the Abel–Ru ni Theorem, see e.g. Rosen
(1995). Even for the simplifying assumption that – = m, “ = 1, the first order condition cannot be solved
analytically, while for – = m, “ = 0, restriction is not optimal.
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γ = 0.9
n*=m
Figure 1: opt. market size nú as a function of pool size m and quality level –
the line, the regulator optimally allows all firms to enter. This area is depicted by the
diagonal plane in Figures 1 and 3 and by the horizontal plane in Figure 2. The regulator
would even prefer a larger market size (n > m) but is restricted to the number of firms
m available in the pool. To the other side, we observe the e ect this paper rationalizes:
the regulator finds it optimal to restrict access by setting some interior value nú < m.
4.5.1 Quality Level –
The quality level – describes how much utility consumers derive from the consumption
of some good before considering decreasing marginal benefits or substitution e ects. If
this quality is large, consumers greatly benefit from large consumption levels even in the
presence of these detrimental e ects. Formally, the value of – enters total welfare via the
term –Q in eq. (11). Quality thus has a larger (positive) impact on welfare if production
levels are high.
As more firms enter the market, the expected level of total production Q increases, as
we know from Lemma 6. Such an increase in production level a ects total welfare both
positively and negatively: positively via the quality – as just mentioned and negatively, on
the other hand, via decreasing marginal benefits to consumers as well as via substitution
e ects. In addition, total firm profits may decrease. For large quality levels –, the
positive e ect receives greater weight. The market can thus be opened further than if –
was small. Only if the number of firms in the market becomes too large, the negative
e ects dominate and a restriction is optimal. We therefore expect the optimal market
size nú to increase with –: more quality puts more emphasis on large consumption levels
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α = 20
n*=m
Figure 2: opt. market size nú as a function of pool size m and product di erentiation “
and hence mandates a large market, despite the cost e ects.
This expectation is confirmed by Figure 1: take a fixed degree of product di erentiation
“. For small sizes m of the firm pool size, it is optimal to have all firms enter the market,
irrespective of the quality level –. This is seen in the diagonal plane left of the solid line.
Here, we have nú = m and ideally, the regulator would allow even more firms compete
but she cannot do so as only m are available (we study the role of m in more detail
in Section 4.5.3). At some point, however, increasing the market size – and thus total
production – brings increasingly negative e ects, such that nú < m becomes optimal.
This tipping point is indicated by the solid line, to the right of which a restriction of
the market size is optimal. Now we increase the quality level –: this shifts the tipping
point – beyond which the negative e ects dominate – further up. As the welfare gain
from the level of production Q increases with –, the regulator wants more firms to enter.
We therefore find:
Result 1. Restricting the market size is optimal if the quality of goods is su ciently low.
4.5.2 Degree of Product Di erentiation “
We now turn to the question how the degree of product di erentiation “ a ects the
optimal market size. Recall that goods are rather independent if “ is close to 0, and
rather substitutable if “ is close to 1. For large values of “, consumers’ utility derived
from the goods is greatly diminished by the substitutability e ects. Formally, “ enters
consumer surplus negatively via the term “qni=1qj ”=i qiqj in eq. (11), and it a ects total
welfare in the same way.
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With a growing number of firms, this detrimental impact on welfare increases. There
is a larger level of total production, and a larger number of di erent goods between which
substitution e ects arise. That is, we expect the negative consequences of substitutability
to be more severe for larger values of n. At the same time, recall the beneficial competition
e ect stemming from an increase in market size. The larger “ is, the more will substitution
outweigh competition, i.e. the sooner we will observe a welfare loss when allowing more
firms to enter.
Figure 2 illustrates this finding. Again, the diagonal plane indicates where the
regulator fully opens the market and would prefer to have even more firms in competition.
At some point, however, we reach the tipping point, indicated by the solid line, beyond
which more competition lowers welfare. This point is reached earlier for larger values of
“: substitution e ects dominate and only a fraction of those firms in the pool is allowed
to enter the market. If goods are too di erentiated or the pool size is too small, the
regulator will not want to limit competition. We summarize this finding:
Result 2. Restricting the market size is optimal if the goods are su ciently substitutable.
So far, we have varied either the quality level – or the degree of product di erentiation
“ while keeping the other parameter fixed. Now, we also consider their interplay. Recall
the threshold at which nú = m was just optimal, i.e. where the regulator grants market
access to all firms in the pool, yet she would not want to admit more if the pool was
larger. We have referred to this as the “tipping point” beyond which restrictions to the
market size became optimal.
In Figure 3, we now fix some pool size m. If the goods are su ciently di erentiated (“
small) and have su ciently high quality (– large), we expect no restriction to competition.
This is observed in the left, flat part of the graph, where access is granted to all firms. As
di erentiation or quality decrease, the benefits of more competition shrink. By varying
either of the two parameters, we reach the point where restriction starts becoming optimal.
Figure 3 reveals that the less di erentiated the goods are (i.e. the larger “), the lower is
the quality threshold below which the regulator limits market access. Conversely, the
higher the quality of the goods (i.e. the larger –), the more substitutability is required
for such a limiting policy to be optimal.
4.5.3 Pool Size m
Finally, we analyze the third market parameter and its e ect on regulation: the number
m of firms seeking to enter. It captures the number of independent draws from the
uniform distribution, forming a profile of costs c. This profile characterizes the pool of m
25
m = 20
n*=m
Figure 3: opt. market size nú as a function of quality level – and product di . “
firms hoping to compete. When we compare di erent values of m, we therefore compare
di erent sample sizes and ask how the regulator’s policy changes if this size increases.
A larger value of this pool size has two e ects. First, it simply allows the regulator
to open up the market further, as she is constrained by her choice to set n Æ m. Second,
however, for a fixed choice of n, the pool size also determines the cost distribution of
those firms entering the market. For any market size, the n most e cient out of the m
available firms enter. Since the firms’ costs are uniformly distributed on the unit interval,
the i-th most e cient firm has expected costs of im+1 (see Appendix B.1 for details). As
the pool size increases by a single firm, this expectation changes to im+2 . Similarly, the
expected e ciency of all other firms grows.
When the regulator opens up the market by increasing n, we identified two counter-
vailing e ects: a gain in welfare due to increased competition, and a loss of welfare due
to increased costs. The latter e ect now is diminished if the pool size has increased, as
each firm has become more e cient. The competition e ect dominates for larger values
of n and we expect the regulator to allow more firms to enter. Only as n gets very large,
the detrimental cost e ect becomes more relevant.
Figures 1 and 2 show this interplay. For low values of m, the regulator wants all firms
to engage in competition. Increasing m hence increases the optimal market size nú by
the same amount, as observed in the diagonal plane in both plots. At some point, the
detrimental cost e ect mentioned above dominates, however, and the regulator starts
restricting access. But even then, a further increase in m has a positive e ect on nú:
instead of a flat plane beyond the “tipping point” indicated by the solid line, we still
observe a growth of nú, even though it remains below m. This growth stems from the
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fact that as the pool size increases to m+ 1, the expected e ciency of the m original
firms rises – both of those that were operating in the market and of those still seeking
entry. The cost e ect driving down welfare is reduced and the regulator allows some
additional firms to enter.
The above analysis explains why the optimal market size increases in the pool size.
First and foremost, however, we restate the main observation: only if su ciently many
firms are available, the regulator finds it optimal to deny access to some of them. For a
small pool size, the competition e ect still dominates the cost e ect and she prefers to
have all firms compete.
Result 3. Restricting the market size is optimal if there are many firms seeking to
compete.
This observation can equivalently be explained in terms of statistical sampling: the
average costs of the n most e cient firms decrease in the sample size m. Only if this
size is su ciently large does the regulator prefer to have a subset of the sample compete
rather than all firms. The advantage of a cost-e cient yet oligopolistic market then
outweighs a more competitive alternative with higher average costs.
As a final remark, recall the results from Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. We just stated that
the pool size m needs to reach some threshold beyond which the regulator limits market
access. Combining this finding with the previous sections, we can determine the e ect of
the other market parameters on this threshold of m. First, it increases with the quality
level –, see Figure 1: if the quality of goods is large, consumers derive large utility values
from high production levels. Unrestricted access becomes more beneficial and is only
dominated if the pool size increases even further. Second, the threshold decreases in the
degree of product di erentiation “, as seen in Figure 2. If goods are rather substitutable
(large “), opening up the market hampers welfare early on. Even for small pool sizes, the
regulator therefore only allows a fraction of firms to enter.
This section has shed some light on the market characteristics and their e ect on the
regulator’s optimal policy. Given the lack of an explicit solution for the optimal market
size, we have resorted to numerical analyzes. These allowed us to see when restriction
becomes optimal from a total welfare perspective, given the parameter ranges for quality
levels, product di erentiation and pool size.
27
5 Robustness & Extensions
The model introduced in Section 3 is a standard extension of the di erentiated duopoly
setting. So far, we have been focusing on a Cournot market with firms which are
heterogeneous in their marginal costs. In such a market it can be optimal for a welfare-
maximizing regulator to restrict competition by limiting the market size, as Proposition 2
states.
In this section, we show that the result is robust to changes in the setup. First
(Section 5.1), we study the move to a Bertrand market, where firms compete in prices
rather than in quantities. Second (Section 5.2), we adapt the model such that firms’
heterogeneity stems from the quality –i (which we so fare assumed to be the same
value – for all firms) of their goods rather than from their marginal costs ci. Finally
(Section 5.3) we change the regulator’s objective function. Up until now, we have assumed
she maximizes total welfare, given by the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits. She
might, however, be more interested in the auction revenue generated from selling the
licenses rather than the actual industry performance. We therefore extend our findings
to the case of a regulator maximizing consumer surplus plus auction revenue.
5.1 Bertrand Competition
In a Cournot market studied above, firms were setting their quantities qi strategically,
with consumers responding via an inverse demand function. If we move to a Bertrand
market, firms instead choose their prices, expecting consumers’ consumption levels. Again,
we can derive equilibrium prices p and quantities q as a function of the cost profile c:
consumers face the optimization problem given by eq. (2), which firms anticipate. Each
firm therefore chooses its profit-maximizing price equal to argmaxpi qi(pi ≠ ci). We defer
the derivation of the equilibrium to the Appendix given the complexity of the expressions,
see eqs. (29) and (30).
Just as in the case of Cournot competition, we want to focus on the case where all
firms want to participate in the market but should not necessarily do so from a total
welfare perspective. We therefore need to identify conditions such that the equilibrium
yields positive prices, demand and profits for all firms, irrespective of the particular
cost profile. Under Bertrand competition with perfect substitutability of goods (“ = 1),
however, we have the standard “winner takes it all” outcome, where the most e cient
firm can always undercut the zero-profit price of its competitors. We hence focus on
product di erentiation levels “ œ [0, 1). In addition, to ensure positivity and uniqueness
of the equilibrium, we again need to assume a lower bound on the joint quality level –,
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analogously to eq. (9).
Lemma 7. If firms compete in a Bertrand market and the quality – of their goods is
su ciently high, there exists an equilibrium in which each firm finds it profitable to enter
the market.
More formally speaking, Lemma 7 states that for any pool size m œ N+ and any
degree of product di erentiation “ œ [0, 1), there exists a lower bound –(m, “) on the
quality such that, if – > –, there is an equilibrium with (q,p) œ R2n+ and ﬁi > 0’i for
every market size n œ {1, . . . ,m} and every cost profile c œ [0, 1]m. As opposed to the
simple threshold we derived in the case of Cournot competition, where Lemma 2 required
– Ø m, the lower bound is more complex in the case of Bertrand. In particular, we have
lim“æ1 – = Œ. As shown in the proof of Lemma 7, positivity of the equilibrium in a
Bertrand setting neither implies nor requires positivity in a Cournot setting. Omitting
solutions where firms set excessively large prices (pi æ Œ) and consumers respond
with zero demand, the equilibrium we derive is unique, which follows follows from the
Poincaré-Hopf index theorem just as for the Cournot case.
In analogy to the Cournot setting, we want to ascertain that more e cient firms
enter the market first. That is, firms with lower marginal costs are supposed to generate
higher profits. The regulator, unaware of the firms’ respective costs, can then expect
those with lower cost realizations to place higher bids in a license auction, allowing them
to be among the restricted set of market participants. We show at the end of the proof
of Lemma 7 that indeed each firm’s profit decreases in its own marginal costs.
Having ensured that all firms find market participation profitable, and that they enter
in the order of their e ciency, we now turn to the regulator’s problem. She specifies the
market size, seeking to maximize expected total welfare. In particular, we ask whether
she may again find it optimal to limit market access by setting a market size n smaller
than the firm pool size m. The answer is positive:
Proposition 3. If firms compete à la Bertrand, it can be welfare-optimal to limit
competition:
÷–, “,m with 0 Æ “ < 1 < m, – Ø – s.t. 1 < argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ec[WBtot(n)] < m.
The qualitative finding of firm heterogeneity rationalizing restrictions to market size
therefore extends to a Bertrand setting. While the computations are more involved given
the more complex market equilibrium (q,p), the intuition is the same as in the Cournot
case, see the discussion in Section 4.4.2.
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5.2 Quality Heterogeneity
So far, we have studied firms which are heterogeneous in marginal costs ci but share the
quality – which their goods have for consumers. Instead, firms could be heterogeneous
in quality, which we analyze in this section. Let each firm’s quality level –i be separable
into a common “base” quality – and a private margin xi ≥ U [0, 1], such that –i = –≠ xi.
We denote a quality profile by x = (x1, . . . , xm). With such individual values for quality,
consumer utility now is given by
U(q) =
nÿ
i=1
–iqi ≠ 12
3 nÿ
i=1
q2i + “
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
qiqj
4
. (18)
For simplicity, we assume all firms’ marginal cost to be zero, i.e. ci = 0 ’i. Häckner (2000)
derives firm prices and consumer demand under Cournot competition:
pi = qi =
[“(n≠ 2) + 2]–i ≠ “qj ”=i –j
(2≠ “)[“(n≠ 1) + 2] (19)
Again, we want to ascertain that all firms find market entrance profitable. We can
ensure positivity of all prices and quantities by requiring a su ciently high base quality
–:
Lemma 8. A su cient condition for prices and quantities given by eq. (19) to be positive
is – Ø m, i.e.
– Ø m∆ pi, qi Ø 0 ’i, n,m, “ s.t. 1 Æ i Æ n Æ m, (x, “) œ [0, 1]m+1. (20)
With zero marginal costs, firm profits are given by qni=1 ﬁi = qni=1 qipi. Total
welfare W–itot with heterogeneous quality levels –i thus simply equals U(q). The following
proposition states that there again are markets where the regulator finds it optimal to
restrict entry in order to maximize welfare.
Proposition 4. If firms are heterogeneous in quality, it can be welfare-optimal to limit
competition:
÷–, “,m with 0 Æ “ Æ 1 < m Æ – s.t. 1 < argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ex[W–itot(n)] < m.
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5.3 A Regulator Interested in Auction Revenue
Up until now, the regulator’s objective was to maximize total welfare given by consumer
surplus plus firm profits. Suppose now the regulator is not intrinsically interested in
industry performance but rather in the extraction of firm profits by auctioning o  licenses
for market entry. Does she still find it optimal to restrict the market size?
To answer this question, we recall Lemma 4, which stated that in n sequential
second-price single-unit open-bid auctions, there is an equilibrium where firms bid their
valuations – i.e. their profits from entering the market – truthfully. Auction revenue in
the first round thus is given by the profits of the second most e cient firm, in the second
round by the third most e cient firm, and so forth to the n-th round, where the revenue
is equal to the profit the (n+ 1)-th most e cient firm would generate if it entered the
market instead of the n-th most e cient one. Using the bidding strategies and notation
introduced in the proof of Lemma 4, we can compute the total auction revenue R and
compare it to total firm profits:
R(n) =
nÿ
i=2
ﬁ(i)(c(1), . . . , c(n)) + ﬁ(n+1)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(n+1))
= WF ≠ ﬁ(1)(c(1), . . . , c(n)) + ﬁ(n+1)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(n+1)). (21)
The regulator now chooses the market size nú maximizing the expected sum of
consumer surplus and auction revenue, Ec[WC(n) + R(n)]. The following proposition
considers the above auction, the equilibrium bidding strategies and the regulatory
objective function to conclude that it can again be optimal to restrict the market size:
Proposition 5. If the regulator maximizes expected consumer surplus plus auction
revenue, it can be welfare-optimal to limit competition:
÷–, “,m with 0 Æ “ < 1 < m, – Ø – s.t. 1 < argmax
nœ{1,...,m}
Ec[WC(n) +R(n)] < m.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel explanation for restrictions to the market size. We show
that a regulator seeking to maximize total welfare may find it optimal to grant market
access only to a limited number of firms, e.g. by issuing a certain number of licenses.
Considering a two-stage game, the regulator faces a finite number of firms seeking to
enter a market. Firms di er in their marginal costs, with the regulator knowing only the
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distribution. In the first stage, the regulator specifies a market size, allowing the most
e cient firms to enter. In the second stage, these firms engage in Cournot competition.
If firms are homogeneous, the standard notion of more competition being better
does apply. That is, the regulator finds it welfare-optimal to allow unrestricted market
entrance. But if firms are heterogeneous, this paper rationalizes regulation. In particular,
expected welfare can be maximized by choosing a certain oligopolistic market size.
We identified a two-fold e ect driving this result. When the market is opened up
and more firms are admitted, there is a change to, first, the degree of competition and,
second, the distribution of production costs in the market. The competition e ect harms
firms and benefits consumers, with a positive net e ect on total welfare. The cost e ect
is ambiguous: new entrants are less e cient and hence drive up average production costs,
but firm profits and total welfare may nevertheless rise – despite a decrease in consumer
surplus. This stems from the observation that if a small firm becomes less e cient, its
more e cient rivals may take over some of its market share. The loss to this small firm is
overcompensated by the additional profit of its competitors, causing overall firm profits
and total welfare to increase.
When the regulator opens up the market, she thus faces a trade-o  between beneficial
competition and a potential decrease in production e ciency. The latter e ect may
outweigh the former, such that she optimally limits the number of firms allowed to
operate. This result does not hinge on the existence of entry costs, search costs or
decreasing returns to scale, which previous literature required.
The two-fold e ect and the optimality of regulation are robust to changes to the model.
We looked at both Cournot and Bertrand competition, at firms being heterogeneous
either in their production costs or in the quality of their goods, and at a regulator
interested in the revenue generated from auctioning o  licenses for market entry. The
paper thus rationalizes the regulatory practice observed in many real-world markets,
where competition is limited by restricted market access.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma directly follows from di erentiating the equilibrium price
and quantity values with respect to marginal costs. Let i, j œ {1, . . . , n}. From eq. (7),
we obtain
dqi
dcj
=
Y][≠⁄[2 + “(n≠ 2)] < 0 if i = j⁄“ Ø 0 if i ”= j
proving part a) and b). Di erentiating eq. (7) yields
dpi
dcj
=
Y][⁄[2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)] > 0 if i = j⁄“ Ø 0 if i ”= j
and thus proves part c).
Proof of Lemma 2. Since pi Ø qi, it su ces to show positivity of qi. The denominator
of eq. (6) is strictly positive while the numerator is decreasing in ck for k = i and
increasing for k ”= i. Hence, consider the cost profile ci = 1, cj = 0. The numerator
becomes –(2 ≠ “) ≠ [2 + “(n ≠ 2)], which decreases in “ for n Ø 2 (for n = 2, qi is
trivially positive). Hence, let “ = 1. We have qi Ø {(2 ≠ “)[2 + “(n ≠ 1)]}≠1(– ≠ n).
Since n Æ m, weak positivity is ensured if – Ø m. Note that positivity is strict unless
– = m = n, “ = 1, ci = 1, cj = 0.
Proof of eq. (12). We use the equilibrium prices and quantities (q, p) derived in Sec-
tion 4.1 to compute the total surplus given a profile of costs c, where we continue to write
⁄ = {(2 ≠ “)[2 + “(n ≠ 1)]}≠1. Here and in subsequent proofs we make use of several
auxiliary computations derived for arbitrary equilibria (q, p) in Appendix B.2.
Wtot = –
nÿ
i=1
qi ≠ 12
nÿ
i=1
q2i ≠
“
2
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
qiqj ≠
nÿ
i=1
qici
= ⁄
2
2
1
–2(2≠ “)2[“(n≠ 1) + 3]n
≠ 2–(2≠ “)2[“(n≠ 1) + 3]
nÿ
i=1
ci
≠ [“3(n≠ 2)(n≠ 1)≠ “2{n(3n≠ 13) + 13}≠ 12“(n≠ 2)≠ 12]
nÿ
i=1
c2i
≠ “[“{“ + (3≠ “)n≠ 6}+ 8]
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj
2
. (22)
33
This yields the four factors ÷1, ÷2, ÷3 and ÷4 of eq. (12). Note that ÷1, ÷3 > 0, while
÷2, ÷4 Æ 0. For expressions of consumer surplus WC and firm profits WF, we use the
same form and obtain the respective coe cients. Consumer surplus is given by
WC = U(q)≠
nÿ
i=1
piqi = ÷C1 + ÷C2
nÿ
i=1
ci + ÷C3
nÿ
i=1
c2i + ÷C4
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj , (23)
with
÷C1 = ⁄
2
2 –
2(2≠ “)2[“(n≠ 1) + 1]n > 0
÷C2 = ≠ ⁄2–(2≠ “)2[“(n≠ 1) + 1] < 0
÷C3 = ⁄
2
2 {“[≠“2(n≠ 2)(n≠ 1) + “(n≠ 7)n+ 7“ + 4n≠ 8] + 4} > 0
÷C4 = ⁄
2
2 “
2[“(n≠ 1)≠ n+ 2] R 0.
For firm profits, we find:
WF =
nÿ
i=1
ﬁi =
nÿ
i=1
(pi ≠ ci)qi = ÷F1 + ÷F2
nÿ
i=1
ci + ÷F3
nÿ
i=1
c2i + ÷F4
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj , (24)
with
÷F1 = ⁄2–2(2≠ “)2n > 0
÷F2 = ≠2⁄2–(2≠ “)2 < 0
÷F3 = ⁄2[“{3“ + n[“(n≠ 3) + 4]≠ 8}+ 4] > 0
÷F4 = ≠⁄2“[“(n≠ 2) + 4] Æ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. To compute the profits of firm i given a profile of costs c, we again
consider the equilibrium quantities and prices (q,p) derived Section 4.1.
ﬁi = qi(pi ≠ ci)
= qi⁄{–(2≠ “) + [2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)≠ ⁄≠1]ci + “
ÿ
j ”=i
cj}
= q2i .
Di erentiation with respect to marginal costs yields
dﬁi
dcj
= 2qi
dqi
dcj
.
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Recall from Lemma 2 that for – Ø m we have qi Ø 0’i. Invoke Lemma 1 for the sign of
dqi
dcj . Combining, we obtain
dﬁi
dci
Æ 0, dﬁidcj Ø 0 if i ”= j,
which proves parts a) and b) of the lemma, respectively.
For part c), consider
d
dci
qipi = qi
dpi
dci
+ pi
dqi
dci
= ⁄2{–(2≠ “)≠ [2 + “(n≠ 2)]ci + “
ÿ
j ”=i
cj}[2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)]
≠ ⁄2{–(2≠ “) + [2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)]ci + “
ÿ
j ”=i
cj}[2 + “(n≠ 2)]
= ≠ ⁄2{–(2≠ “)“2(n≠ 1) + 2[2 + “(n≠ 2)][2 + “(n≠ 2)≠ “2(n≠ 1)]ci
+ “3(n≠ 1)ÿ
j ”=i
cj}
Æ 0
Finally, for part d), we need to show that the derivative of consumer surplus with
respect to any firm’s marginal costs is negative. From eq. (23), we obtain
dWC
dci
= ÷C2 + 2÷C3 ci + 2÷C4
ÿ
j ”=i
cj .
Recall that ÷C2 < 0 and ÷C3 > 0, while the sign of ÷C4 is ambiguous. Since the derivative is
linear in cj , we consider the case of both cj = 0 and cj = 1. For ÷C4 > 0, we have
dWC
dci
Æ ÷C2 + 2÷C3 + 2÷C4 (n≠ 1)
= ≠ ⁄2(–≠ 1)(2≠ “)2[1 + “(n≠ 1)] Æ 0.
If, on the other hand, ÷C4 Æ 0, it holds true that
dWC
dci
Æ ÷C2 + 2÷C3
= ⁄2{4[1 + “(n≠ 2)] + “2[7≠ 2“ + n{3“ ≠ 7 + n(1≠ “)}]≠ –(2≠ “)2[1 + “(n≠ 1)]}
Æ ≠⁄2(n≠ 1){4 + “[{4≠ “(5≠ 2“)}n+ “(7≠ 2“)≠ 8]}
Æ 0,
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where we have used that – Ø n at the second inequality. This proves that consumer
surplus WC is weakly decreasing in every firm’s marginal costs.
Proof of Proposition 1. From eq. (22) for total welfare Wtot we obtain
dWtot
dci
= ÷2 + 2÷3ci + 2÷4
ÿ
j ”=i
cj ,
where ÷2, ÷4 Æ 0, ÷3 > 0. Hence, we consider the cost profile ci = 1, cj = 0 ’j ”= i and
assume “ = 1, yielding
dWtot
dci
----“=ci=1,
cj=0
= 2n2 + n(2≠ –)≠ 2–≠ 1.
Since we need – Ø m by Lemma 2 and n Æ m by assumption, we consider n = –.
Here, the derivative takes the form n2 ≠ 1, which is strictly positive unless there is a
monopoly. We thus have identified market situations where, given the model at hand, an
increase in some firm’s marginal costs can cause total welfare to rise.
Proof of Lemma 4. We introduce the following notation. We refer to the firms by the
order statistics of their marginal costs c(1) Æ . . . Æ c(m), such that the index (i) signifies
the i-th most e cient firm. Denote by [c]n the set of subsets with n elements, i.e. the
possible combinations of firms which can be active in a market of size n. ﬁ(i)(cn) is the
profit of firm i in a market where the firms cn œ [c]n compete. Note that this profit
is equal to zero if c(i) /œ cn (i.e. if the firm is not active in the market) and that it is
strictly positive otherwise by Lemma 2 apart from the polar case discussed at the end of
Section 4.1, when it is zero. Recall that this polar case as well as a cost realization with
c(i) = c(j) for i ”= j have zero probability mass due to m being finite and can be covered
using a tie breaking rule. Finally, for each of the k œ {1, . . . , n} sequential auctions,
denote by w(k) œ {1, . . . ,m} the firm winning this auction, identified by the firm’s order
statistic (i). Since bids are public and a second-price auction is played each round, a
bidding strategy for round k can be contingent on w(kÕ) for all kÕ < k.
We now construct a profile of bidding strategies as follows: in equilibrium, the k-th
auction will be won by the k-th most e cient firm, i.e. w(k) = k for all k œ {1, . . . , n},
such that the n most e cient firms will indeed each hold one item (“license”) each. In
each round k, we therefore check whether for all past auctions kÕ < k the kÕ-th round
was won by the kÕ-th most e cient firm, i.e. whether w(kÕ) = kÕ for all kÕ < k.
On-path strategies: Let all firms i Æ n bid their on-equilibrium market valuation given
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by ﬁ(i)(c(1), . . . , c(n)), while the remaining firms i > n bid the o -equilibrium valuation
of them entering the market instead of firm (n), i.e. instead of the least e cient active
firm: ﬁ(i)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(i)). Finally, since there is a cap of one item per bidder, firms
having won an item (i.e. in round k all firms i s.t. ÷kÕ < k with w(kÕ) = i) in a previous
round bid zero in the future.
Recall that a firm’s profit decreases in its marginal costs and hence for all cn we have
ﬁ(i)(cn) Ø ﬁ(j)(cn) if and only if i Æ j. For the same reason it holds that for all c and
i > n: ﬁ(n)(c(1), . . . , c(n)) Ø ﬁ(i)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(i)). Note that in the latter statement
we compare two di erent profiles of active firms while in the first the firms are the same.
Combining these inequalities we conclude that, ceteris paribus, a more e cient firm
always has a higher valuation and places a higher bid if it follows the strategies above.
Using these strategies, the k-th auction will be won by the k-th most e cient firm and
the desired outcome is implemented.
O -path strategies: We now need to ensure that more e cient firms have no incentive
to initially lower their bids in order to wait for rounds when only very ine cient rivals
are still bidding, providing them with much lower second-highest bids of their rivals. The
most e cient firm, for example, could obtain the n-th license at a price much lower than
the first license without running the risk of not obtaining a license at all. To avoid this,
we now define bids for the case where in some past round kÕ a di erent firm than the
kÕ-th most e cient has placed the highest bid, i.e. if in round k ÷kÕ < k s.t. w(kÕ) ”= kÕ.
Using the notation introduced above, ﬁ(1)(c(1)) denotes the monopoly profit of the most
e cient firm. Given a cost profile c, this value is an upper limit for the possible profits
across firms i and market market sizes n.17 Now for every round after some kÕ ”= w(kÕ),
all firms with i < n who do not yet hold a license bid ﬁ(1)(c(1)), while all firms with i > n
bid zero. Firm n bids the monopoly profit if the deviant is among the more e cient
firms, i.e. if w(kÕ) < n, while it bids zero otherwise, i.e. if a firm that was not supposed
to enter the market in equilibrium has done so.
This grim trigger strategy deters deviations in two ways. First, it prevents more
e cient firms (i < n) from postponing their bids in order to win later, cheaper rounds.
If they do not acquire their item in the round they are supposed to, they will only be
able to do so at a price equal to the monopoly profit, making a later entry unattractive.
Second, it also prevents overbidding of less e cient firms (i > n). Initially, none of these
firms have an incentive to acquire a license: in any round k Æ n, a firm i > n would be
17This follows from noting that for any market size n, any cost profile cn and any firm i we have
ﬁ(i)(cn) = [q(i)(cn)]2 from eq. (6). Since the production level q(i) decreases if an additional firm is added
irrespective of the entrant’s costs, the profit of i also decreases.
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paying a price ﬁ(k)(c(1), . . . , c(n)), which is greater than its own profit if the profile of
competitors remained unchanged. However, if all firms – instead of only the remaining
n≠ k most e cient ones – would then move to monopoly bids, the deviating firm i could
hope that a tie breaking rule will cause less e cient firms (j > n) to enter, increasing its
own profit beyond the price initially paid. The o -path strategies above ensure that if a
less e cient firm enters the market it will nevertheless only face the n≠ 1 most e cient
rivals, making overbidding unattractive.
Proof of Lemma 5. First consider the case where the costs are not known by the regulator.
With ci = c ≥ U [0, 1] ’i, we have E[ci] = 12 , E[c2i ] = E[cicj ] = 13 . Plugging this into
eq. (22) for total welfare yields
Ec[Wtot] = Ec[÷1 + ÷2
nÿ
i=1
ci + ÷3
nÿ
i=1
c2i + ÷4
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj ]
= ÷1 +
1
2n÷2 +
1
3[n÷3 + n(n≠ 1)÷4]
= n[1 + 3–(–≠ 1)][3 + “(n≠ 1)]6[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2 .
To analyze the e ect of an increase in the market size n on expected welfare, we take
the derivative:
d
dn Ec[Wtot] =
[1 + 3–(–≠ 1)]{6 + “[n(1≠ “) + “ ≠ 5]}
6[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2 ,
which is strictly positive ’–, “, n,m s.t. 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ n Æ m Æ –. Next, consider the
case where the costs are ci = c ’i with c being public. We have
Wtot = ÷1 + n÷2c+ [n÷3 + n(n≠ 1)÷4]c2
= n(–≠ c)
2[3 + “(n≠ 1)]
2[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2 ,
∆ ddnWtot =
(–≠ c)2{6 + “[n(1≠ “) + “ ≠ 5]}
2[2 + “(n≠ 1)]3 ,
which again is weakly positive ’–, “, n,m, c s.t. 1 Æ n Æ m Æ –, (c, “) œ [0, 1]2 and equal
to zero only for the polar case of a monopoly with – = c = 1 (recall that n Æ –).
Proof of Proposition 2. We combine eq. (22) and Appendix B.1 for the computation of
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total welfare with expectations over marginal costs:
Ec[Wtot] = ÷1 + ÷2
nÿ
i=1
Ec[ci] + ÷3
nÿ
i=1
Ec[c2i ] + ÷4
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
Ec[cicj ]
= ÷1 + ÷2
n(n+ 1)
2(m+ 1) + ÷3
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
3(m+ 1)(m+ 2) + ÷4
n(n≠ 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
4(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
= n · {24(2≠ “)2(m+ 1)(m+ 2)[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2}≠1
·
5
12–(2≠ “)2(m+ 2)[3 + “(n≠ 1)][–(m+ 1)≠ (n+ 1)]
+ 4(n+ 1)(n+ 2){12 + “[“(13≠ 2“) + (3≠ “)n[4 + “(n≠ 3)]≠ 24]}
≠ 3“(n≠ 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 2){8 + “[“ + (3≠ “)n≠ 6]}
6
, (25)
for arbitrary parameters satisfying 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ n Æ m Æ –. The numerator is a
polynomial of fifth degree in n, the denominator one of second degree. We hence cannot
find a general solution for the welfare-maximizing value of n by the Abel–Ru ni Theorem.
To prove existence of interior solutions, consider the case of – = m = 10, “ = 1. We
obtain Ec[Wtot] = [n(n+ 2)(156 965 + n{(2n+ 7)n≠ 1 430})][3 168(n+ 1)2]≠1, which can
be maximized numerically.18 There are five values for nú satisfying ddn Ec[Wtot]|nú = 0.
Ignoring the solutions nú1 < 0, nú2 > m as well as complex values nú3, nú4 s.t. Im(nú3),
Im(nú4) ”= 0, we obtain the interior optimum nú5 ¥ 5.38, noting that 1 < nú5 < m.
Computing the second order derivative, it is readily verified that nú5 is indeed a maximizer.
To verify that consumers benefit from an increase in competition, consider ddn Ec[WC(n)]
and note that it is increasing in both – and m. Hence, let – = m = n to see that the
derivative is positive for all 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ n.
Proof of Lemma 6. The expected level of total production is given by
Ec[Q] =
n–≠qni=1 E[ci]
2 + “(n≠ 1) . (26)
Using qni=1 E[ci] = n(n+1)2(m+1) from Appendix B.1, we obtain
dEc[Q]
dn =
⁄2(2≠ “)2
2(m+ 1) {≠“n
2 ≠ 2(2≠ “)n+ (2≠ “)[2–(m+ 1)≠ 1]}. (27)
Since we have n Æ m by assumption and m Æ – from Lemma 2, the positive term in
18The computations using Mathematica are available upon request.
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{. . .} dominates the negative ones and the whole derivative is positive.
Proof of Lemma 7. From the consumers’ optimization problem, eq. (2), we derive their
consumption levels. Di erentiating and summing over all firms yields demand qi given
prices p:
qi = ›1 ≠ ›2pi + ›3
ÿ
j ”=i
pj , (28)
with coe cients
›Õ = {(1≠ “)[1 + “(n≠ 1)]}≠1, ›1 = ›Õ–(1≠ “), ›2 = ›Õ[1 + “(n≠ 2)], ›3 = ›Õ“.
Firms anticipate this demand when setting their prices by maximizing ﬁi = qi(pi ≠ ci).
Considering eq. (28), their optimization problem is given by
max
piœR+
(›1 ≠ ›2pi + ›3
ÿ
j ”=i
pj)(pi ≠ ci).
Summing the respective first order conditions over all firms and rearranging yields
pi =
1
(2›2 + ›3)[2›2 ≠ (n≠ 1)›3]
5
›1(2›2 + ›3) + ›2[2›2 ≠ (n≠ 2)›3]ci + ›2›3
ÿ
j ”=i
cj
6
= ›4 + ›5ci + ›6
ÿ
j ”=i
cj , (29)
with coe cients
›ÕÕ = {[2 + “(n≠ 3)][2 + “(2n≠ 3)]}≠1, ›4 = ›ÕÕ–(1≠ “)[2 + “(2n≠ 3)],
›5 = ›ÕÕ[1 + “(n≠ 2)][2 + “(n≠ 2)], ›6 = ›ÕÕ“[1 + “(n≠ 2)].
Plugging eq. (29) into eq. (28), we obtain consumer demand given c:
qi = ›7 ≠ ›8ci + ›9
ÿ
j ”=i
cj , (30)
with coe cients
›7 = ›Õ›4[1+“(n≠2)], ›8 = ›ÕÕ›2{2+“(≠6+5“+n[3+“(n≠2)])}, ›9 = ›Õ›6[1+“(n≠2)].
We now turn to positivity of the equilibrium. Note that all coe cients ›1, . . . , ›9
are weakly positive. Since ›4 > 0 (recall that “ < 1 in the Bertrand setting), prices
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are trivially strictly positive. To ensure positivity of demand, note that qi Ø ›7 ≠ ›8 ’c.
Hence, a su cient condition is ›7›8 > 1, which is equivalent to
– Ø 2 + “(≠6 + 5“ + n[3 + “(n≠ 2)])(1≠ “)[2 + “(2n≠ 3)] © –
ú(n, “).
Note that ˆ–úˆn Ø 0’“ œ [0, 1). Since the model requires n Æ m, it su ces to have
– > –ú(m, “) © –. We hence conclude that
’m œ N+, “ œ [0, 1) ÷– > 0 s.t.: – > –∆ pi, qi > 0
’i, n, c s.t. 1 Æ i Æ n Æ m, c œ [0, 1]m,
with – = 2 + “(≠6 + 5“ +m[3 + “(m≠ 2)])(1≠ “)[2 + “(2m≠ 3)] . (31)
We make several remarks. First, let – = –. All firms still post strictly positive
prices and have strictly positive demand, unless the polar case ci = 1, cj = 0’j ”= i
and n = m occurs. Here, the demand for firm i goes to zero. Second, note there
is no finite lower bound on – ensuring positive quantities for all degrees of product
di erentiation, as opposed to the case of Cournot competition. This follows from ˆ–ˆ“ Ø 0
and lim“æ1 – =Œ. Third, su ciency in a Bertrand setting neither implies nor requires
su ciency in a Cournot setting. That is, – Ø – does not necessarily imply – Ø m or
vice versa. This is readily seen from –|“=0 = 1 and lim“æ1 – =Œ’m œ N+.
Next, we turn to firm profits. In particular, we want to ascertain that ﬁi = qi(pi ≠ ci)
is positive for every firm and every profile of costs. We have already identified a condition
ensuring that qi > 0. Hence, we only need to check whether pi Ø ci holds for all c œ [0, 1]m.
Recalling the equilibrium price from eq. (29), this is equivalent to
›4 + (›5 ≠ 1)ci + ›6
ÿ
j ”=i
cj Ø 0.
Noting that ›5≠ 1 Æ 0 and ›6 Ø 0, this expression is bounded below by setting ci = 1 and
cj = 0’j ”= i. The requirement thus is satisfied if ›41≠›5 Ø 1, which holds true if – Ø –.
To see that each firm’s profit decreases in its marginal costs, consider
dﬁi
dci
= dqidci
(pi ≠ ci) + qi(dpidci ≠ 1)
= ≠›8(pi ≠ ci) + qi(›5 ≠ 1) Æ 0,
using ›8 Ø 0, pi ≠ ci Ø 0, qi Ø 0 and ›5 ≠ 1 Æ 0 from above for – Ø –.
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof mirrors the Cournot case. Only di erences are the
market equilibrium (q,p), where prices and quantities are now given by eqs. (29) and (30),
as well as the quality threshold – now defined by eq. (31). We compute total welfare
given a profile of costs c:
WBtot = 12{(1≠ “)[2 + “(n≠ 3)][1 + “(n≠ 1)[2 + “(2n≠ 3)]}≠2
·
1
n–2(1≠ “)2[3 + “(n≠ 4)][1 + “(n≠ 2)][1 + “(n≠ 1)][2 + “(2n≠ 3)]2
≠ 2–(1≠ “)2[3 + “(n≠ 4)][1 + “(n≠ 2)][1 + “(n≠ 1)][2 + “(2n≠ 3)]2
nÿ
i=1
ci
+ (1≠ “)[1 + “(n≠ 2)][1 + “(n≠ 1)]
Ó
“4[n(n[n(3n≠ 28) + 94]≠ 132) + 66]
+ “3(n≠ 2)[85 + n(18n≠ 85)] + 3“2[55 + n(13n≠ 55)] + 36“(n≠ 2) + 12
Ô nÿ
i=1
c2i
≠ “(1≠ “)[1 + “(n≠ 1)][1 + “(n≠ 2)]2
)
3“2[5 + n(n≠ 5)]
+ 11“(n≠ 2) + 8
* nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj
2
. (32)
Applying the expected order statistics from Appendix B.1, we obtain
Ec[WBtot] = {24(1≠ “)(m+ 1)(m+ 2)[2 + “(n≠ 3)]2[1 + “(n≠ 1)][2 + “(2n≠ 3)]2}≠1
· n[1 + “(n≠ 2)]
Ë
3n6“4 + n5“3(30≠ 31“)
+ n4“2(“(64“ + 48–(“ ≠ 1)(m+ 2)≠ 175) + 99)
≠ n3“
Ó
“
!
“(69≠ 151“) + 48–2(“ ≠ 1)“(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
+ 48–(“ ≠ 1)(6“ ≠ 5)(m+ 2) + 192
"
≠ 120
Ô
+ n2
Ó
“
!
“((965≠ 379“)“ ≠ 723) + 48–2(“ ≠ 1)“(7“ ≠ 5)(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
+ 12–(“ ≠ 1)(“(29“ ≠ 60) + 28)(m+ 2) + 96
"
+ 48
Ô
≠ 3n
Ó
(4“ ≠ 3)(“(“(7“ + 20)≠ 40) + 16) + 4–2(“ ≠ 1)“(3“ ≠ 2)(19“ ≠ 14)(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
≠ 4–(“ ≠ 1)(3“ ≠ 2)(“(7“ + 3)≠ 6)(m+ 2)
Ô
+ 2(3“ ≠ 2)
Ó
“(“(58“ ≠ 129) + 96) + 6–2(“ ≠ 1)(3“ ≠ 2)(4“ ≠ 3)(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
≠ 6–(“ ≠ 1)(3“ ≠ 2)(4“ ≠ 3)(m+ 2)≠ 24
ÔÈ
. (33)
Again, no explicit solution exists for general parameters 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ n Æ m Æ –.
To show the existence of an interior solution 1 < nú < m, we considers the case – = 90,
“ = 0.9 and m = 20. Computing the extreme values numerically and excluding all
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those which are either below 1, above m or whose imaginary part is nonzero, we obtain
nú ¥ 16.898, with the second order derivative verifying that it is a maximum indeed.
Proof of Lemma 8. We have “ œ [0, 1] and m Ø n Ø 1. For n > 1, the denominator of
eq. (19) is concave in “ and positive for “ œ {0, 1}, thus for all “ œ [0, 1]. For n = 1,
positivity is trivial.
The numerator is increasing in –k for k = i and decreasing for k = j ”= i. By
assumption, we know – Ø m and xi œ [0, 1]. Hence
[“(n≠ 2) + 2]–i ≠ “
ÿ
j ”=i
–j = (2≠ “)–≠ [“(n≠ 2) + 2]xi + “
ÿ
j ”=i
xj
Ø (2≠ “)–≠ [“(n≠ 2) + 2]
Ø (2≠ “)m≠ [“(m≠ 2) + 2]
Ø 0,
with equality only if n = m = –.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using –i = –≠ xi, we can rewrite the production levels qi in the
market equilibrium given by eq. (19). Recall the definition ⁄ = {(2≠ “)[2 + “(n≠ 1)]}≠1
to obtain
qi = ⁄
Ë
–(2≠ “)≠ [2 + “(n≠ 2)]xi + “
ÿ
j ”=i
xj
È
, (34)
which mirrors the equilibrium output in the case of cost heterogeneity from eq. (6) with
costs ci replaced by marginal quality xi. Total welfare in the case of quality heterogeneity
is given by
W–itot = U(q) = –
nÿ
i=1
qi ≠ 12
nÿ
i=1
q2i ≠
“
2
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
qiqj ≠
nÿ
i=1
qixi, (35)
which in turn mirrors the expression for total welfare in the case of cost heterogeneity
from eq. (22). But since xi and ci are both i.i.d. draws from U [0, 1], the distributions of
their order statistics coincide. Hence, all results for the expected value Ec[Wtot] directly
carry over to Ex[W–itot] and we can apply Proposition 2. That is, from the regulator’s
perspective, expected total welfare is given by eq. (25) and the same interior maxima
exist.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that for all firms i and all cost profiles c it holds that
ﬁi(c) = [qi(c)]2. We can therefore rewrite the profit of the most e cient firm by separating
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the e ect of c1, (c2, . . . , cn≠1) and cn:
ﬁ(1)(c(1), . . . , c(n)) = ⁄2{ –2(2≠ “)2 ≠ 2–(2≠ “)[2 + “(n≠ 2)]c(1) + 2–(2≠ “)“c(n)
+ 2–(2≠ “)“
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c(i) + [2 + “(n≠ 2)]2c2(1) + “2c2(n) + “2
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c2(i)
≠ 2[2 + “(n≠ 2)]“c(1)c(n) ≠ 2[2 + “(n≠ 2)]“c(1)
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c(i)
+ 2“2c(n)
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c(i) + “2
n≠1ÿ
i=2
n≠1ÿ
j=2
j ”=i
c(i)c(j)} (36)
The bid of the (n+ 1)-th most e cient firm is the second highest in the n-th auction
and hence is paid by the n-th most e cient firm for obtaining the last license. Firm (n+1)
bids the profit it would generate if it was to enter the market instead of firm (n), the
other rivals’ costs remaining the same. We directly obtain ﬁ(n+1)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(n+1))
from eq. (36) by replacing c(1) with c(n+1) and c(n) with c(1). This allows us to write the
total auction revenue:
R(n) = WF ≠ [ﬁ(1)(c(1), . . . , c(n))≠ ﬁ(n+1)(c(1), . . . , c(n≠1), c(n+1))]
= WF ≠ ⁄2{ 2–(2≠ “)[2 + “(n≠ 2)](c(n+1) ≠ c(1)) + 2–(2≠ “)“(c(n) ≠ c(1))
≠ [2 + “(n≠ 2)]2(c2(n+1) ≠ c2(1)) + “2(c2(n) ≠ c2(1))
+ 2[2 + “(n≠ 2)]“[(c(n+1) ≠ c(n))c(1) + (c(n+1) ≠ c(1))
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c(i)]
+ 2“2(c(n) ≠ c(1))
n≠1ÿ
i=2
c(i)} (37)
We combine eq. (23) for consumer surplus with eq. (37) for auction revenue and use
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the order statistics from Appendix B.1 to obtain:
Ec[WC(n) +R(n)]
= {24(2≠ “)2(m+ 1)(m+ 2)[2 + “(n≠ 1)]2}≠1
·
5
n5“2(3≠ “) + n4“2(8 + 3“) + n3“[144≠ 12–(2≠ “)2(m+ 2)≠ “(83≠ 11“)]
+ n2{240 + 12–2“(2≠ “)2(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
≠ 12–(2≠ “)(6 + “)(m+ 2) + “[48≠ “(140 + 3“)]}
+ 2n{312≠ 6–(7≠ “)(2≠ “)2(m+ 2)
+ 6–2(3≠ “)(2≠ “)2(m+ 1)(m+ 2)≠ “[528≠ “(214≠ 5“)]}
+ 48(2≠ “)[–“(m+ 2)≠ 2 + “]
6
, (38)
for arbitrary parameters satisfying 0 Æ “ Æ 1 Æ n Æ m Æ –. Just as in the proof
of Proposition 2, we observe that the numerator is a polynomial of fifth degree in n,
the denominator one of second degree. We hence cannot find a general solution for the
welfare-maximizing value of n by the Abel–Ru ni Theorem. To prove existence of interior
solutions, again consider the case of – = m = 10, “ = 1. We obtain Ec[WC+R(n)] = [2n5+
11n4 ≠ 1 368n3 + 148 465n2 + 308 146n+ 5712][3 168(n+ 1)2]≠1, which can be maximized
numerically. There are five values for nú satisfying ddn Ec[WC(n)+R(n)]|nú = 0. Ignoring
the solutions nú1 < 0, nú2 > m as well as complex values nú3, nú4 s.t. Im(nú3), Im(nú4) ”= 0,
we obtain the interior optimum nú5 ¥ 5.10, noting that 1 < nú5 < m. Computing the
second order derivative, it is readily verified that nú5 is indeed a maximizer.
Appendix B Auxiliary Computations
Appendix B.1 Order Statistics
To compare the welfare for di erent values of the market size n, the regulator has to form
expectations over the marginal costs ci of those firms that will be active in the market. In
particular, we need to compute expectations of the terms appearing in eq. (12). Recalling
Lemma 3, more e cient firms – i.e. those with lower marginal costs – can be expected to
enter the market first as they generate higher profits.
Thus, from the regulator’s perspective, we are interested in the expected costs of the
n most e cient firms out of m, with firm costs c1, . . . , cm being an i.i.d. sample from
U [0, 1]. That is, we need to compute expectations for the first n order statistics.
45
Incorporating the cases of heterogeneity in both costs (ci) and quality (–i), we follow
the notation of David and Nagaraja (2003) in that we write X for the random variable
(“cost type”) and denote by X(i:m) the i-th order statistic of a sample with size m. That
is, the variables are ordered such that
X(1:m) Æ . . . Æ X(n:m) Æ . . . Æ X(m:m).
To simplify notation, we write X(i) whenever the sample size is m. Realizations are
denoted by lowercase letters. The following paragraphs closely follow David and Nagaraja
(2003), Chapter 2.
Distributions: Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the unordered
random variables Xk and F(i)(x) the cdf of the i-th order statistic X(i). Verbally, the
latter denotes the probability that at least i of the m (unordered) Xk are less than or
equal to x:
F(i)(x) =
mÿ
k=i
A
m
k
B
[F (x)]k[1≠ F (x)$m≠k. (39)
Di erentiating and rearranging yields the probability density function (pdf):
f(i)(x) =
d
dxF(i)(x)
= f(x)
5 mÿ
k=i
m!
k!(m≠ k)!k[F (x)]
k≠1[1≠ F (x)]m≠k
≠
mÿ
k=i
m!
k!(m≠ k)! (m≠ k)[F (x)]
k[1≠ F (x)]m≠k≠1
6
= f(x)
5 m≠1ÿ
k=i≠1
m!
k!(m≠ k ≠ 1)! [F (x)]
k[1≠ F (x)]m≠k≠1
≠
m≠1ÿ
k=i
m!
k!(m≠ k ≠ 1)! [F (x)]
k[1≠ F (x)]m≠k≠1
6
= mf(x)
A
m≠ 1
i≠ 1
B
[F (x)]i≠1[1≠ F (x)]m≠i (40)
For the third equality, we have shifted the index of the first sum while at the second sum
we note that the last term (where k = m) equals zero.
Using the specific distribution X ≥ U [0, 1], the pdf of the i-th order statistic for
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x œ [0, 1] is given by:
f(i)(x) =
m!
(i≠ 1)!(m≠ i)!x
i≠1(1≠ x)m≠i. (41)
Since we will encounter “mixed terms” when computing expected types, we also need to
consider the joint pdf of X(i), X(j). For i Æ j and xi Æ xj , it holds that
f(i,j)(xi, xj) =
m!
(i≠ 1)!(j ≠ i≠ 1)!(m≠ j)!x
i≠1
i (xj ≠ xi)j≠i≠1(1≠ xj)m≠j . (42)
For a derivation, see e.g. David and Nagaraja (2003) eq. (2.2.2).
Expected values: To compute expectations of the order statistics x(i) as well as
squared and mixed terms, we make use of the Beta function defined by
B(i, j) =
⁄ 1
0
xi≠1(1≠ x)j≠1 dx for general i, j > 0
= (i≠ 1)!(j ≠ 1)!(i+ j ≠ 1)! for i, j œ N+. (43)
This yields the expected marginal cost of the i-th most cost e cient firm:
E[x(i)] =
⁄ 1
0
xf(i)(x) dx
= 1
B(i,m≠ i+ 1)
⁄ 1
0
x(i+1)≠1(1≠ x)(m≠i+1)≠1 dx
= B(i+ 1,m≠ i+ 1)
B(i,m≠ i+ 1)
= i
m+ 1
The following equalities will prove useful. They are computed in a similar way.
E[x2(i)] =
i(i+ 1)
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
E[x(i)x(j)] =
i(j + 1)
(m+ 1)(m+ 2) for i < j
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Summing over the first n out of m order statistics – that is, the n most e cient firms –
allows us to compute the expectations of the terms appearing in eq. (12):
nÿ
k=1
E[x(k)] =
n(n+ 1)
2(m+ 1)
nÿ
k=1
E[x2(k)] =
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
3(m+ 1)(m+ 2)
nÿ
k=1
ÿ
l ”=k
E[x(k)x(l)] =
n(n≠ 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
4(m+ 1)(m+ 2) = 2
nÿ
k=1
k≠1ÿ
l=1
E[x(k)x(l)]
Appendix B.2 Summations
In the proofs of Appendix A, we computed welfare for the default scenario of Cournot
competition with cost heterogeneity as well as for extensions with Bertrand competition,
quality heterogeneity and auction revenue maximization. For these computations, general
expressions for arbitrary equilibrium profiles (q,p) in quantities and prices were used,
both in the analytical derivation and in the computational implementation. This section
briefly presents summations frequently occurring in these derivations.
Since market equilibria di er across the scenarios, consider an arbitrary profile (q,p)
with qi = µ1 + µ2ci + µ3
q
j ”=i cj and pi = ‹1 + ‹2ci + ‹3
q
j ”=i cj for i œ {1, . . . , n}. We
find:
nÿ
i=1
qi = nµ1 + [µ2 + (n≠ 1)µ3]
nÿ
i=1
ci,
nÿ
i=1
ciqi = µ1
nÿ
i=1
ci + µ2
nÿ
i=1
c2i + µ3
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj ,
nÿ
i=1
q2i = nµ21 + [2µ1µ2 + 2(n≠ 1)µ1µ3]
nÿ
i=1
ci + [µ22 + (n≠ 1)µ23]
nÿ
i=1
c2i
+ [(n≠ 2)µ23 + 2µ2µ3]
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj ,
nÿ
i=1
qipi = nµ1‹1 + [µ1‹2 + (n≠ 1)µ1‹3 + µ2‹1 + (n≠ 1)µ3‹1]
nÿ
i=1
ci
+ [µ2‹2 + (n≠ 1)µ3‹3]
nÿ
i=1
c2i + [µ2‹3 + µ3‹2 + (n≠ 2)µ3‹3]
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj .
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nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
qiqj = (n≠ 1)nµ21 + 2(n≠ 1)µ1[µ2 + µ3(n≠ 1)]
nÿ
i=1
ci
+ (n≠ 1)µ3[2µ2 + µ3(n≠ 2)]
nÿ
i=1
c2i
+ [µ22 + 2(n≠ 2)µ2µ3 + µ3{1 + n2 + 2µ3 ≠ n(2 + µ3)}]
nÿ
i=1
ÿ
j ”=i
cicj .
The summations above allow us to derive general expressions for total welfare and its
components – consumer surplus and firm profits – given di erent equilibria. We make
use of these equations in Appendix A.
References
Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A. and Kreider, B. (2001), ‘The e ciency of indirect taxes
under imperfect competition’, Journal of Public Economics 81(2), 231–251.
Baron, D. P. and Myerson, R. B. (1982), ‘Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs’,
Econometrica 50(4), 911–930.
Binmore, K. and Klemperer, P. (2002), ‘The biggest auction ever: The sale of the British
3G telecom licenses’, The Economic Journal 112(478), C74–C96.
Borenstein, S. (1988), ‘On the e ciency of competitive markets for operating licenses’,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(2), 357–385.
Cellini, R., Lambertini, L. and Ottaviano, G. I. (2004), ‘Welfare in a di erentiated
oligopoly with free entry: A cautionary note’, Research in Economics 58(2), 125–133.
Che, Y.-K., Iossa, E. and Rey, P. (2016), ‘Prizes versus contracts as incentives for
innovation’, TSE Working Paper 16-695. Revised version of December 2017.
Corchón, L. C. (2008), ‘Welfare losses under Cournot competition’, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 26(5), 1120–1131.
Crémer, J. and McLean, R. P. (1988), ‘Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and
dominant strategy auctions’, Econometrica 56(6), 1247–1257.
David, H. A. and Nagaraja, H. N. (2003), Order Statistics, Wiley, New York.
Eliaz, K. and Forges, F. (2015), ‘Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists’, Economics
Letters 126(Supplement C), 167–170.
49
Fréchette, G. R., Lizzeri, A. and Salz, T. (2019), ‘Frictions in a competitive, regulated
market: Evidence from taxis’, American Economic Review 109(8), 2954–92.
Häckner, J. (2000), ‘A note on price and quantity competition in di erentiated oligopolies’,
Journal of Economic Theory 93(2), 233–239.
Heller, C.-P. and Sudaric, S. (2019), Eigentor: Die Zentralvermarktung der Fußballmedi-
enrechte, Komplementaritäten und das Alleinerwerbsverbot (Own goal: The centralised
sale of football media rights, complementarities and the no-single-buyer-rule). Available
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428880.
Hsu, J. and Wang, X. H. (2005), ‘On welfare under Cournot and Bertrand competition
in di erentiated oligopolies’, Review of Industrial Organization 27(2), 185–191.
Iosifidis, P. and Papathanassopoulos, S. (2019), Greek ERT: State or public service
broadcaster?, in E. Po≥oÒska and C. Beckett, eds, ‘Public Service Broadcasting and
Media Systems in Troubled European Democracies’, Springer International Publishing,
Cham, Switzerland, pp. 129–153.
Kasberger, B. (2018), Can auctions maximize welfare in markets after the auction?,
Working paper.
Kawakami, K. (2017), ‘Welfare consequences of information aggregation and optimal
market size’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9(4), 303–323.
Kimmel, S. (1992), ‘E ects of cost changes on oligopolists’ profits’, The Journal of
Industrial Economics 40(4), 441–449.
Lagos, R. (2003), ‘An analysis of the market for taxicab rides in new york city*’,
International Economic Review 44(2), 423–434.
Lahiri, S. and Ono, Y. (1988), ‘Helping minor firms reduces welfare’, The Economic
Journal 98(393), 1199–1202.
Ledvina, A. and Sircar, R. (2011), ‘Dynamic Bertrand oligopoly’, Applied Mathematics
& Optimization 63(1), 11–44.
Ledvina, A. and Sircar, R. (2012), ‘Oligopoly games under asymmetric costs and an
application to energy production’, Mathematics and Financial Economics 6(4), 261–
293.
50
McNulty, P. J. (1968), ‘Economic theory and the meaning of competition’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 82(4), 639–656.
Rosen, M. I. (1995), ‘Niels Hendrik Abel and equations of the fifth degree’, The American
Mathematical Monthly 102(6), 495–505.
Salop, S. C. and Sche man, D. T. (1983), ‘Raising rivals’ costs’, The American Economic
Review 73(2), 267–271.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942), Socialism, capitalism and democracy, Harper and Brothers,
New York.
Singh, N. and Vives, X. (1984), ‘Price and quantity competition in a di erentiated
duopoly’, The RAND Journal of Economics 15(4), 546–554.
Spence, M. (1984), ‘Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance’, Economet-
rica 52(1), 101–121.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1981), ‘Potential competition may reduce welfare’, The American Economic
Review 71(2), 184–189.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1987), ‘Competition and the number of firms in a market: Are duopolies
more competitive than atomistic markets?’, Journal of political Economy 95(5), 1041–
1061.
Suzumura, K. and Kiyono, K. (1987), ‘Entry barriers and economic welfare’, The Review
of Economic Studies 54(1), 157–167.
van Damme, E. (2002), The Dutch UMTS-Auction, CESifo Working Paper 722, Munich.
Vickers, J. (1995), ‘Competition and regulation in vertically related markets’, The Review
of Economic Studies 62(1), 1–17.
Vives, X. (1999), Oligopoly pricing-old ideas and new tools: Old ideas and new tools, MIT
Press, Cambridge, Mass.
von Weizsäcker, C. C. (1980), ‘A welfare analysis of barriers to entry’, The Bell Journal
of Economics 11(2), 399–420.
51
